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Abstract
Do firms seek to make the market transparent, or do they confuse the consumers
in their product perceptions? We show that the answer to this question depends
decisively on preference heterogeneity. Contrary to the well-studied case of homo-
geneous goods, confusion is not necessarily an equilibrium in markets with differen-
tiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent
consumers are relatively rare, firms strive to fully educate consumers. By contrast,
if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion
becomes part of the equilibrium strategies. The adverse welfare consequences of
confusion can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not
only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option, or inefficiently refrain
from buying. Qualitatively similar insights obtain for political contests, in which
candidates compete for voters with heterogeneous preferences.
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1 Introduction
When purchasing goods such as smartphones, motor vehicles or insurance, consumers
often make mistakes. To a certain extent, such mistakes reflect consumer confusion.
This has been documented across various sectors, including retailing, financial services,
utilities, telecommunication, the hospitality industry or health insurance (Eppler and
Mengis, 2004; Walsh et al., 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2013; Kasabov, 2015).1 Based
on several decades of evidence, there is a broad consensus in marketing science that
“consumers mix up, misidentify, or make wrong (i.e. illfounded) inferences about products
and/or erroneous product selections” (Mitchell and Kearney, 2002, p. 357).
Firms can influence the degree of confusion through their own activities. On the one
hand, firms can engage in measures to educate consumers: They can describe products
transparently to facilitate comparison, or they can inform consumers about their true
needs (e.g., by providing free trials). On the other hand, firms have means to confuse
consumers. For instance, insurance companies may issue contracts with complicated
premium-deductible schemes that impede comparisons with those of other firms. When
advertising differentiated products, firms may emphasize irrelevant product details rather
than those characteristics that really matter to consumers. Manufacturers of sophisti-
cated products, such as smartphones, digital cameras, or laundry machines, may add
attributes with unclear value to their products.
These issues are not specific to consumption choices. Like firms facing consumers,
political candidates facing voters can reduce confusion by stating their policies clearly,
or they can “becloud their policies in a fog of ambiguity” (Downs, 1957). The literature
suggests that “complexity, obfuscation, vagueness, and uncertainty are permanent fea-
tures of American electoral politics” (Gill, 2005, p. 372) and that candidates deliberately
obscure their positions (Downs, 1957; Franklin, 1991; Tomz and Van Houweling, 2009;
Rovny, 2012; Jacobson and Carson, 2015).
Do information providers, such as firms or political parties, seek to educate or confuse
their audiences? The special case of homogeneous choice options may suggest that the
answer is clear-cut. For example, oligopolistic producers of homogeneous goods suffer
from the temptation to undercut each others’ prices, resulting in a zero-profit equilib-
rium under well-known conditions.2 The literature on behavioral industrial organization
has shown that obfuscation techniques often allow firms to escape the “Bertrand trap”:
1See “Why the confusion of the cell phone market has caused millions to switch,” Forbes, May 2017,
for a recent report about consumer confusion in the cell phone industry.
2Such an equilibrium arises, e.g., if the following conditions hold simultaneously: static interaction,
identical and constant marginal costs, no capacity constraints, complete information (Tirole, 1988).
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Suppliers of homogeneous goods can secure positive profits in environments where the
same would be impossible if consumers were not confused.3 In this paper, we show that
firms need not benefit from, and may even be averse to consumer confusion in the case
of heterogeneous choice options. This may seem surprising, as the scope for confusion
with heterogeneous products is larger. For example, there can be many ways to present
the differences between products, and the dimensions that firms emphasize are likely to
influence the perceived valuations. Nevertheless, the incentives to confuse consumers are
less clear-cut, because firms usually obtain positive profits in differentiated goods mar-
kets even without obfuscation. Accordingly, by blurring the perception of consumers,
obfuscation may reduce rather than increase profits.
We introduce a general framework to uncover under which conditions strategic con-
testants (firms, political candidates, etc.), who compete for heterogeneous agents (con-
sumers, voters, etc.), communicate their choice options clearly or ambiguously, respec-
tively. The agents’ true preferences are characterized by a distribution of match values
for two contestants, who can influence their payoffs by choosing their communication
strategies and efforts.
The chosen communication strategies jointly determine the agents’ perception of prod-
uct valuations, potentially introducing errors to their comparisons of choice options.
Agent confusion arises if the perceived and true valuations disagree. We begin by assum-
ing that communication strategies influence the comparison of alternatives by inducing
stochastic perturbations, which do not affect the average valuation differences. Agent
confusion then results in unsystematic decision mistakes, meaning that the agents cannot
be systematically fooled.4 These perception errors can have different origins, such as
product complexity, attribute uncertainty or limited comparability because of framing
effects; see Section 4.1 for an intuitive discussion and Appendix S.1 for a formalization.
Contrary to communication strategies, the chosen efforts have unambiguous effects on
3For instance, firms can benefit from hidden fees (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Ellison and Ellison,
2009; Heidhues et al., 2016), spurious differentiation resulting from the credulity of consumers (Spiegler,
2006), product complexity (Gabaix and Laibson, 2004) or combative marketing (Eliaz and Spiegler,
2011a,b), from coarse thinking (Mullainathan et al., 2008), incomparable price formats (Carlin, 2009;
Piccione and Spiegler, 2012; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2013; Spiegler, 2014), from increasing consumer search
costs (Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012), or from consumers lacking (intertemporal) self-control (Heidhues and
Kőszegi, 2017); see also Grubb (2015).
4The unbiasedness assumption can be seen to play a similar disciplining role in our analysis as the
“conformity with the prior” assumption in Bayesian models of persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011), costly information acquisition (Caplin and Dean, 2015), or information design (Armstrong and
Zhou, 2019).
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how the agents evaluate the contestants. Examples of such efforts are price reductions (a
lower price unambiguously increases the relative attractiveness for all consumers) or cer-
tain advertising measures (a more prominent option unambiguously captures relatively
more attention). The decisive feature of our analysis is that the interaction between the
communication strategies and the dispersion of true preferences determines the distribu-
tion of perceived valuations, and thereby the intensity of competition.
We formalize the above notions in a two-stage, non-cooperative, complete information
game, where the contestants first simultaneously choose their communication strategies
and then their efforts. Finally, each agent selects the contestant (buys a product, casts a
vote) which she perceives as offering the higher value to her.
Main Result Our main finding is that agent preferences play a decisive role for whether
confusion or education is supported as equilibrium outcome. While contestants always fa-
vor minimal competition, whether they can achieve this by confusing or educating agents
depends critically on the true dispersion of opinions in the agent population. We iden-
tify intuitive properties of the preference distribution that determine whether contestants
will engage in obfuscation or education. Specifically, we distinguish between indecisive
preferences, for which, loosely speaking, indifferent agents are relatively common, and
polarized preferences, for which strong opinions prevail. For instance, in a standard
textbook Hotelling model with symmetric firms, consumer preferences are indecisive (po-
larized) if the density of the consumer distribution has a maximum (minimum) at the
midpoint of the Hotelling interval.
Whether preferences are polarized or indecisive in a given setting is an empirical ques-
tion; both cases seem to be relevant. To illustrate the properties, consider the hospitality
industry. It is hard to imagine that most guests will be indifferent when faced with the
choice between a “family” hotel and a “business” hotel – instead, most consumers will
clearly prefer one alternative over the other, resulting in a polarized preference distri-
bution. By contrast, there will be many more undecided consumers if the comparison
is between two different business hotels, in line with indecisive preferences. In politics,
polarized preferences prevail when partisan tendencies are pronounced – whether this is
the case may vary across jurisdictions and time.
Education is the equilibrium outcome with polarized preferences if the range of deci-
sion mistakes is limited by the degree of true taste differentiation. This condition means
that, even for the largest possible mistake, the agent with the strongest preferences for
one contestant will not switch to the other contestant given identical efforts of the con-
testants. By contrast, there cannot be an equilibrium without agent confusion when
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preferences are indecisive. Even stronger results emerge if the communication profiles
can be ordered in terms of the error dispersion they induce (e.g., by mean-preserving
spreads). With polarized preferences, education then is the only equilibrium outcome.
By contrast, with indecisive preferences the unique equilibrium features maximal con-
fusion, and the equilibrium communication profile leads to a more extreme dispersion
of perceived valuations compared to the true distribution. Finally, we consider the case
where obfuscation possibilities are “massive” relative to true preferences, meaning that
even the agents who are most loyal to a contestant could be confused enough to choose
the dominated option. Then, confusion may arise in equilibrium even with polarized
preferences.
Crucially, these results reflect the interplay between the shape of the true preference
distribution and the effects of communication. Competition forces contestants to fight
for the marginal agents, that is, for the agents who perceive the two options as equally
valuable. The larger the mass of such perceptually indifferent agents, the fiercer is compe-
tition, and the less profitable the market becomes. When true preferences are indecisive,
so that undecided “moderates” are common and “extremists” with strong opinions are
rare, confusion reduces the mass of perceptually indifferent agents, as it converts more
indecisive agents into extremists than vice versa. The opposite logic applies to the case of
polarization, where undecided agents are rare and those with strong opinions are common.
Then, education must decrease the mass of perceptually indifferent agents.
After presenting the general analysis, we derive some results that are more specific to
our two applications. For price competition, the welfare analysis differs substantially from
the homogeneous goods case studied by the literature. Absent a binding outside option,
the main effect of consumer confusion in a homogeneous good setting is redistribution
of rents from consumers to firms. By contrast, obfuscation implies that some consumers
choose dominated options in a differentiated goods setting, resulting in an inefficient mar-
ket outcome. We also show that policy measures directed at fostering competition, e.g.,
by means of product standardization, can backfire because they increase firms’ incentives
to confuse.
Further, we illustrate that the possibility of a binding outside option does not diminish
the firms’ incentives to obfuscate in the case of indecisive preferences: On the contrary,
firms may deliberately choose to engage in obfuscation even if this means that some con-
sumers (inefficiently) abstain from purchasing any product. This may help to understand
why confusion remains prevalent in many cases, despite the development of a large body
of “confusion reduction strategies” (Mitchell and Papavassiliou, 1999).5 Likewise, our
5See Chernev et al. (2015) for a survey of related issues. The marketing literature has occasionally
5
main results continue to apply if consumers differ in their degree of sophistication, or in
how prone to confusion they are (Walsh et al., 2007). All told, our analysis shows that
with differentiated goods, consumer confusion is less likely to arise in equilibrium than
with homogeneous goods, but if it occurs, its effects are more severe.6
When applied to political competition, our approach sheds new light on a long-
standing question in the literature. Various authors have asked why political candidates
or parties often choose ambiguous platforms rather than specifying their intended poli-
cies clearly (e.g., Shepsle, 1972; Aragones and Neeman, 2000; Callander and Wilson, 2008;
Kartik et al., 2017). Our analysis highlights the role of voter heterogeneity for this de-
cision. Candidates select ambiguous platforms if the share of indecisive voters is large.
In such a case, obfuscation distorts the preference distribution in such a way that strong
opinions become more common, and moderate views more rare. This is beneficial for
candidates, as it reduces the subsequent intensity of the campaign. By contrast, with
pre-existing polarization of the preference distribution, strategic candidates do not de-
sire ambiguous platforms, because voter confusion backfires by increasing the share of
indifferent voters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general framework. Section
3 presents the main results. Section 4 applies the general setting to product market
competition. Section 5 contains the application to political economy. Section 6 concludes.
All proofs and additional results are relegated to Appendices A and S.
2 The Model
A unit measure of agents needs to decide between the choice options offered by two
contestants i = 1, 2. Agent preferences are characterized by a distribution of match
values (vk1 , v
k
2) ∈ R2 for the contestants, where the match advantage of contestant i = 2
for agent k ∈ [0, 1] is given by vk∆ ≡ vk2 −vk1 . The match advantages vk∆ are dispersed over
the agent population according to an exogenously given distribution function G0, which
is commonly known by the contestants, and admits a zero-symmetric density function
conjectured that consumer confusion may serve to raise revenues (Mitchell and Papavassiliou, 1999;
Mitchell and Kearney, 2002; Haan and Berkey, 2002), but this issue has not been further explored yet
(Kasabov, 2015).
6Our results also contrasts with Spiegler (2019), who asks whether agents with mis-specified causal
models can be systematically fooled as measured by biased expectations: We show that even if there
is no average perception bias, contestants may exploit the agents due to a competition softening effect
triggered by confusion.
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g0 (i.e., g0(x) = g0(−x) ∀x ∈ R).7 Each contestant can influence the agents’ choices by
means of two different instruments.
On the one hand, each contestant can choose a communication strategy ai ∈ A from
some exogenously given set A. The respective communication profile (a1, a2) = a ∈ A ≡
A2 influences the agents’ perception of the match advantages. For example, the com-
munication strategies could correspond to the ambiguity of the political platforms (see
Section 5), or to the marketing campaigns that influence which associations consumers
make when thinking about the product (Mullainathan et al., 2008). As we detail in
Section 4.1, they could also amount to “presentation formats” that jointly influence how
easy it is to compare the alternatives (Piccione and Spiegler, 2012; Chioveanu and Zhou,
2013; Spiegler, 2014), or they could reflect “product complexity” as determined by the
number of advertised product attributes (Mützel and Kilian, 2016). For any communi-
cation profile a ∈ A, the perceived match advantage ṽk∆(a) of contestant i = 2 for agent
k is determined according to
ṽk∆(a) = v
k
∆ + εa. (1)
where εa is a (possibly degenerate) random variable with distribution function Γa, which
is independent of vk∆.
8 Expression (1) yields an analytically convenient reduced form
to capture agent confusion, and one that is consistent with several key findings from
marketing, consumer research and psychology, which we elaborate in Section 4.1 and
Appendix S.1.9
On the other hand, each contestant can exert an “effort” si ∈ S ⊂ R to persuade
the agents to choose in his favor, given the dispersion of perceived match advantages
ṽk∆. For example, such efforts could correspond to the advertising intensities of political
candidates or firms, or they could represent (the negative of) product prices. Contrary to
communication strategies, efforts always have homogeneous effects on how agents evaluate
the contestants, where a higher si unambiguously increases every agent’s evaluation of
contestant i relative to his competitor. Specifically, agent k chooses contestant i = 1 if
and only if ṽk∆(a) ≤ s1 − s2, that is, the perceived match advantage of contestant 2 is
smaller than the effort advantage of contestant 1.
Let Ga denote the distribution function of the perceived match advantages ṽ
k
∆ of
contestant i = 2. For any given communication-effort profile (a, (s1, s2)), the fraction of
7The formulation in terms of match advantages, rather than absolute values, highlights the compar-
ative nature of the agents’ thinking. Absent a binding outside option, this is without loss of generality
(see Section 4.4).
8Our main insights do not hinge on the independence of εa and v
k
∆; see Appendix S.5 for an example.
9Gabaix and Laibson (2004) and Kalaycı and Potters (2011) consider a similar additive structure of
the decision utility in the case of homogeneous preferences.
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agents who choose contestant i = 1, or the market share of this contestant, is equal to
Ga(s1−s2). Likewise, the market share of contestant i = 2 is Ga(s2−s1) = 1−Ga(s1−s2).
We consider the following general form of the contestants’ expected payoffs
Πa1(s1, s2) = R(s1, s2)Ga (s1 − s2)− C(s1),
Πa2(s1, s2) = R(s2, s1) (1−Ga(s1 − s2))− C(s2),
(2)
where both R : R2 → R+ and C : R→ R+ are twice continuously differentiable.
The idea behind (2) is that, besides co-determining the market shares, the efforts could
influence the revenue earned per unit of market share, and they could also be costly for
the contestants. For example, if the contestants are political parties and si represents
their campaigning intensity, then we can interpret the “market share” Ga as the share
of favorable voters, C(si) as the campaigning costs, and R(si, sj) = R̄ > 0 ∀si, sj, as the
value of recruiting an additional voter. The contestants can also be firms, in which case
we may use si to represent the advertising effort undertaken by i to persuade consumers
to choose its product. Here, the formulation R(si, sj) allows that the efforts of both firms
could jointly determine the willingness-to-pay of individual consumers, e.g., as in Von der
Fehr and Stevik (1998).
In both examples, the effort expenditures are out-of-pocket costs and non-contingent,
i.e., independent of success (market share). The above framework also includes the case
where effort expenditures are of a purely implicit nature. As an example, consider two zero
marginal-cost firms competing for consumers in prices p1, p2 ≥ 0. In our framework, this
can be accommodated by setting S = (−∞, 0], pi = −si (hence Ga(s1−s2) = Ga(p2−p1)),
R(si, sj) = −si, and C(si) = 0 ∀si, sj. In this example, a higher effort s1 (i.e., a lower
price p1) increases the market share at the implicit cost of a lower revenue per consumer
served. As a result, the (implicit) effort expenditures are directly related to the market
share. Other applications with competitive firms are conceivable.10
We study the above setting as a two-stage complete information game played between
the contestants, invoking the standard notion of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) as
the solution concept. In the communication stage, both contestants simultaneously choose
their communication strategies ai ∈ A. In the subsequent effort stage, they decide on
how much effort si to exert.
Confusion or education? Our key question is under what conditions either confusion
or agent education arises as a stable market outcome, intentionally induced by strategic
10For instance, the model of retail bank competition for customer deposits (see Freixas and Rochet,
2008) can be embedded in our framework by assuming that efforts correspond to the interest rates
granted to depositors.
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contestants. Specifically, can education be sustained as an equilibrium outcome if edu-
cating the agents is feasible for the contestants? If not, would the contestants want to
induce as much agent confusion as possible? The following definition clarifies our notions
of “confusion” and “education”.
Definition 1 We say that a communication profile a ∈ A induces agent confusion (is ob-
fuscating) if ṽk∆(a) and v
k
∆ are not equal in distribution, i.e., Ga 6= G0. A communication
profile a ∈ A induces agent education (is educating) if Ga = G0.
Throughout the main analysis, we suppose that the effects of communication on the
agents’ perception of the match advantages are unbiased, meaning that εa in (1) is zero-
symmetrically dispersed. In other words, we assume that for any given a ∈ A, either (i)
εa = O, where O is any random variable that is almost surely equal to zero, or (ii) the
distribution function of εa satisfies Γa(x) = 1 − Γa(−x) ∀x ∈ R. We take Γa to have a
density γa whenever εa 6= O.
Intuitively, the zero-symmetry of εa implies that while the contestants may be able
to increase or decrease the noise in the perception process, they cannot systematically
bias the perceived match advantage distribution.11 Such unbiasedness is consistent with
how the notion of confusion is often used, for instance, in the marketing literature; see
Section 4 and Appendix S.1. As an illustration, suppose that each contestant can choose
product “features” (attributes, advertising slogans, labels,...), where each feature has an
i.i.d. effect on the consumer evaluation of that product. Then, the number ai ∈ A ⊂ N
of features implemented corresponds to the communication strategy of contestant i, and
quantifies i’s contribution to agent confusion. The unbiasedness assumption means that
some consumers value the addition of such additional features, whereas others are put
off by the increase in complexity. Viewed through this lens, the core question of our
paper is whether rational contestants would ever seek to implement features with such
double-edged effects.
What matters for our analysis is that the contestants can possibly induce noise in the
comparisons made by the agents. While in this paper we emphasize various behavioral
explanations for confusion, we do not mean to exclude that similar perception errors
could also arise from a highly sophisticated decision process.12 As we show in Section
11This does not rule out that communication can bias the levels of the perceived match values (ṽk1 , ṽ
k
2 ).
We consider such a possibility in Section 5.2. Moreover, unbiasedness does not require that v∆ and εa
are independent; see Appendix S.5 for an illustrative example.
12As an example, it is a common result in models with noisy signals that Bayesian agents condition
their actions on the signals they observe. That is, while the agents behave deterministically according to
their posterior expectations, the expectations themselves are stochastic, as they depend on the particular
9
4.5, our results also apply with differentially sophisticated agents.
Together with the symmetry of G0, the unbiasedness of εa implies that the perceived





g0(v − e)dΓa(e), is itself zero-symmetric. These expressions reveal a simple
interaction between true preferences, captured by G0, and the perception errors induced
by communication profile a, which is decisive for whether confusion or education are
equilibrium phenomena, as we show in the next section.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We derive the SPE of the game by backward induction. Section 3.1 characterizes the
symmetric second-stage effort equilibrium. Section 3.2 shows how preferences determine
whether confusion can arise in equilibrium. Sections 3.3 and Section 3.4 sharpen the
equilibrium predictions.
3.1 The Effort Stage
The payoff functions (2) together with the symmetry of G0 and Γa imply that the con-
testants play a symmetric game in the competition stage for any given a ∈ A. The
subsequent analysis concentrates on symmetric equilibria (s1 = s2 = s) in the effort
stage.13 For the equilibrium analysis, we require a technical assumption which, as we
show in Sections 4 and 5, holds in our major applications to price and political competi-
tion.
Assumption 1 The following conditions are satisfied:
(A1.1) Πai (si, sj) is strictly quasi-concave in si, ∀sj ∈ S, a ∈ A and i, j = 1, 2.
(A1.2) ∀a ∈ A ∃ s ∈ S such that z(s) = ga(0), where
ga(0) ≡
∫








and R` is the partial derivative of R with respect to its `-th argument.
(A1.3) z(s) is strictly increasing, and R1(s, s) +R2(s, s) < 2C
′(s) ∀s ∈ S.
signal that has realized. See Johnson and Myatt (2006) for an example, where noisy valuations arise as
posterior expectations induced by more or less noisy advertising.
13A symmetric (stage) game with a differentiable structure, as the one studied here, always has a








Π 𝑔𝑔𝒂𝒂(0) Π 𝑔𝑔𝒂𝒂𝒂(0)
𝑠𝑠𝒂𝒂𝒂∗
The figure shows the equilibria in the effort stage for two different values a,a′ (left),
and the corresponding level of equilibrium payoffs (right).
Figure 1: Equilibrium in the effort stage
Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium in the effort
stage. As the following result demonstrates, the measure ga(0) of perceptually indifferent
agents fully determines the effort equilibrium, reflecting the battle for the agents who
perceive the two contestants as equally valuable.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For any a ∈ A a unique symmetric equi-
librium exists, and both contestants choose s∗a = z
−1(ga(0)). The equilibrium payoff is
strictly decreasing in ga(0) for each contestant.
Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. Assumption (A1.1) and (A1.2) jointly assure equilib-
rium existence, where the equilibrium effort s∗a is characterized by the first-order condition
ga(0) = z(s
∗
a). For any a ∈ A, there is a unique equilibrium effort level s∗a because z(s)
is strictly increasing by (A1.3). This assumption amounts to the standard regularity
condition that the equilibrium marginal benefits, as a function of s, must intersect with
marginal costs from above. An exogenous increase in the measure of perceptually indif-
ferent agents ga(0) intensifies competition, resulting in a higher equilibrium effort level.
Finally, the negative relation between the equilibrium payoffs and efforts (see the right
panel of Figure 1) follows from the last part of (A1.3). This assumption captures that
a possible increase in the contestants’ payoffs due to higher equilibrium efforts must be
dominated by higher effort expenditures.
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3.2 Communication Behavior
We now analyze the equilibrium in the communication stage. The following properties
of true preferences will be decisive for whether firms want to communicate or educate in
this equilibrium.
Definition 2 Let δ > 0 be such that [−δ, δ] ⊂ supp(g0).
(i) (Indecisiveness) True match advantages are
(a) weakly δ-indecisive if g0(0) > g0(x) ∀x ∈ [−δ, 0) ∪ (0, δ],
(b) δ-indecisive if g0 is strictly increasing (decreasing) on [−δ, 0] (on [0, δ]), and
(c) strongly δ-indecisive if g0 is strictly concave on [−δ, δ].
(ii) (Polarization) True match advantages are
(a) weakly δ-polarized if g0(0) < g0(x) ∀x ∈ [−δ, 0) ∪ (0, δ],
(b) δ-polarized if g0 is strictly decreasing (increasing) on [−δ, 0] (on [0, δ]), and
(c) strongly δ-polarized if g0 is strictly convex on [−δ, δ].
Strong δ-indecisiveness implies δ-indecisiveness and thus weak δ-indecisiveness. For δ-
indecisive preferences, less pronounced valuation differences occur more frequently than
more pronounced ones, while weakly δ-indecisive preferences only require that indifference
(v∆ = 0) occurs more often than all other alternatives on [−δ, δ]. The relation between
the different concepts of polarization is similar. Our most general result (Theorem 1) only
requires the weakest notions of indecisiveness and polarization; the stronger concepts help
to obtain equilibrium uniqueness and monotonicity (Theorem 2).
The analysis of the SPE requires additional structure on the communication technol-
ogy. For definiteness, we assume that (a) agent education is among the feasible options
for the contestants, and (b) each contestant can always force some confusion unilaterally,
that is, choose an action such that confusion will emerge no matter what the opponent
chooses. As we will sketch below, it is straightforward to adjust the analysis to the case
that (a) or (b) is violated. To simplify the exposition, we adopt the convention that
A ⊂ R+ and the communication strategy profile 0 is educating, i.e., ε0 = O.
Assumption 2 The set A ⊂ R2+ satisfies the following two conditions:
(A2.1) 0 ∈ A.















(b) With indecisiveness, g0(0) > gã(0).
Figure 2: The heterogeneous effects of agent confusion, εã ∼ U [−0.5, 0.5].
We are now ready to state our first main result.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) If there exists δ > 0 with supp(εa) ⊂ [−δ, δ] ∀a ∈ A and the true match values are
weakly δ-polarized, then an SPE without consumer confusion exists.
(ii) If there exists δ > 0 with supp(εa) ⊂ [−δ, δ] ∀a ∈ A and the true match values are
δ-indecisive, then no SPE without consumer confusion exists.
Theorem 1 shows the decisive role of the shape of the true match value distribution
for firms’ communication strategies. The rationale is simple. Each obfuscating commu-
nication profile (i.e., εa 6= O) distorts the perceived distribution of the match advantages
over the agent population. Thereby, some truly indifferent consumers come to perceive
one contestant as strictly superior, while some consumers who strictly favor one contes-
tant over the other may become indifferent. By Lemma 1, the contestants benefit from
confusion if and only if the former effect dominates the latter. With polarized match
advantages, confusion pushes more agents towards indifference than vice versa, which
intensifies the competition for market shares in the effort stage, as illustrated in Figure
2(a). In such a situation, therefore, both contestants have a strict incentive to avoid an
obfuscated market. Because full agent education is feasible (condition (A2.1)), education
must be part of an SPE.
By contrast, confusion successfully reduces the measure of perceptually indifferent
agents if true match values are indecisive, as Figure 2(b) shows. Thus, even though the













(b) Equal taste differentiation
Figure 3: Taste differentiation and preference distribution
market, confusion is an effective means to soften competition. As any contestant can force
some confusion on the market (condition (A2.2)), agent education cannot be supported
as an equilibrium outcome.14
In the leading applications of our framework (product market competition and po-
litical candidates competing for votes), the (Lebesgue) measure λ(supp(g0)) quantifies
the agents’ taste differentiation; the larger λ(supp(g0)), the more differentiated the true
tastes are. An interesting conclusion of Theorem 1 is that, under the conditions of the
theorem, only the shape of g0 matters for the type of equilibrium communication; taste
differentiation per se plays no role. For example, if preferences are δ-indecisive, agent
confusion is the only possible equilibrium, even with an arbitrarily large degree of taste
differentiation. To illustrate, suppose that supp(γa) ⊂ [−1, 1] ∀a ∈ A. The distributions
g0 and g
′
0 in Figure 3(a) differ in their degrees of taste differentiation, but in both cases
an SPE with education exists. By contrast, g0 and g
′
0 in Figure 3(b) have the same degree
of taste differentiation, but an education equilibrium only exists in the latter case.
14If, contradicting condition (A2.2), agent education could be enforced unilaterally, then part (i)
of Theorem 1 would be strengthened in that only SPE with agent education exist. More generally,
without (A2.2) there could be SPE with agent education, regardless of the shape of the true match value
distribution. Specifically, if, similar to Heidhues et al. (2016), each contestant could assure education
by choosing some communication activity ae ∈ A, i.e., εa = O if ae ∈ {a1, a2}, then education (with
both firms choosing ae) would always be an equilibrium outcome. Note, however, that with polarized
preferences any SPE featuring confusion will strictly dominate such an education equilibrium from the
perspectives of the contestants.
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3.3 How Much Confusion?
Up to this point we have put no order structure on the various distribution functions
{Γa}a∈A. Given that consumer confusion is of an unbiased nature, a natural starting
point is to presume that the distribution functions {Γa}a∈A can be ordered using the
notion of a mean-preserving spread (MPS). Formally, for two random variables X and
Y , Y is an MPS of X if Y has the same distribution as X + η, where η 6= O and
E[η|X] = 0.15 Intuitively, Y is a noisy version of X. The above assumptions trivially
imply that any communication profile inducing confusion corresponds to an MPS of the
distribution corresponding to an educating profile. We now require more generally that
all noise distributions can be ordered via MPS.
Assumption 3 (MPS ordering) A ⊂ R+ is compact, and εa = O ⇔ a = 0. More-
over, ∀a, a′ ∈ A with a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′, Γa′ is an MPS of Γa.
Note that Assumption 3 implies Assumption 2 whenever 0 ∈ A and A contains more than
one element. Moreover, agent confusion is maximal (minimal) according to the MPS order
if both firms choose ā ≡ maxA (a ≡ minA). In particular, the communication profile
(ā, ā) induces maximal agent confusion as measured by the variance of the perceived
match advantages.
Most examples we discuss in Appendix S.1 to support (1) feature the MPS ordering.
For instance, consider the above-mentioned example where communication strategies
correspond to the number of i.i.d features implemented by a contestant: The more such
features are implemented, the more noisy the perceived valuations become. Another class
of examples arises when the members of the family {Γa}a∈A are truncations of each other.
This order conveniently preserves essential features of the original distribution, such as
log-concavity of the density or the shape of γa. This essentially amounts to assuming that
greater confusion increases the scope for the possible perception errors, while leaving the
underlying stochastic principles behind the perception errors unaltered.16
Our second main result strengthens Theorem 1 by showing that under the MPS or-
dering a unique SPE exists, featuring either maximal or minimal confusion, depending
on the distribution of true preferences.
15Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) show that if the involved distribution functions have a uniformly
bounded support, then the MPS ordering between distributions is equivalent to the order induced by
second-order stochastic dominance. Müller (1998) shows how to extend this equivalence to the case of
an unbounded support.
16For any given a ∈ A, Γa is the truncation εa ≡ ε|ε∈[−ωa,ωa] of a random variable ε with zero-
symmetric density γ and supp γ = (−ω̄, ω̄), 0 ≤ ωa < ω̄. Then, Γa′ is an MPS of Γa iff ωa′ > ωa.
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Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold.
(i) If there exists δ > 0 such that supp(εa) ⊂ [−δ, δ],∀a ∈ A and true match values are
strongly δ-indecisive, then there exists a unique SPE, and confusion is maximal.
(ii) If there exists δ > 0 such that supp(εa) ⊂ [−δ, δ],∀a ∈ A and true match values are
strongly δ-polarized, then there exists a unique SPE, and confusion is minimal.
By Assumption 3, a contestant i can always unilaterally enforce more (less) confusion
in the MPS sense, provided that ai < ā (ai > a). Following the above logic, each
firm will therefore choose its maximal (minimal) available ai for indecisive (polarized)
preferences. Therefore, both contestants coordinate on the communication profile that
induces maximal confusion. The opposite reasoning applies with strongly polarized match
values.
In Appendix S, we formulate a variant of Theorem 2 using an alternative order, which
we call two-sided single crossing. This property is more restrictive than MPS, but it
allows us to use indecisiveness (polarization) rather than strong indecisiveness (strong
polarization). Finally, note that, appropriately modified, Theorem 2 applies even when
0 /∈ A, so that it is not possible for the contestants to fully educate the agents. In such a
case, both contestants would coordinate on the SPE featuring minimal agent confusion
by playing a in the communication stage under polarization.
3.4 Massive Confusion
Theorems 1 and 2 apply to situations where the scope for agent confusion is constrained
by the degree of the existing taste differentiation, i.e., supp(εa) ⊂ supp(g0) ∀a ∈ A. In
other words, for equal second-stage efforts, obfuscation can never induce agents with the
most extreme true valuations in favor of one contestant to switch to the other contestant.
We next study an extension where such “massive” reversals in agent opinions are possible.
Agent confusion is called massive, whenever supp(g0) ( supp(εa) for some a ∈ A. Our
next result uses the tractable case of uniformly distributed perception errors εa to show
that, even with polarized preferences, contestants may choose to obfuscate the market if
massive confusion is possible.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, and εa is uniformly distributed on
[−ωa, ωa], where ωa ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A. Let ω̄ ≡ maxa∈A ωa. Then, the unique SPE features
maximal confusion (ωa∗ = ω̄) if either (i) true match values are indecisive on supp(g0),
or (ii) true match values are polarized on supp(g0) and ω̄ is sufficiently large.
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For indecisive agents, the prediction from Theorem 2 that contestants want to obfuscate
as much as possible immediately generalizes to the case of massive confusion.17 How-
ever, maximal confusion can now arise as the unique SPE, despite polarized preferences.
The reason is that if contestants can induce sufficiently large potential differences in the
perceived match advantages, then the measure of indifferent agents must eventually de-
crease, regardless of g0.
18 Finally, the key insight from the literature on competition with
boundedly rational consumers and homogeneous products, according to which obfusca-
tion arises in equilibrium, can be seen as the limiting case of Theorem 3: In a situation
where true match advantages are arbitrarily close to zero, any confusion is massive, so
that contestants (i.e., firms) must benefit from introducing it.
Remark What drives the massive obfuscation result is the possibility to create extreme
valuations that have no counterpart in the distribution of true valuations. This possibility
appears particularly plausible when true preferences are close to homogeneous. However,
there may be conceivable circumstances in which the agents’ perceived valuations must
remain contained in the support of the distribution of true valuations. For example, if
individual consumers have a basic understanding of a market, but not of which option
is best for them, the effects of confusion on perceived valuations may be bounded by
the true valuation distribution. We discuss such a situation in Appendix S.5 by means
of a Salop circle: Agents know the contestants’ locations (e.g., the properties of the
candidates’ political platforms), but they do not know their own locations. We assume
that, although individual agents may be confused about their true locations (and thus
the true match advantages of the contestants), they understand the general situation that
they must be located somewhere on the circle. In this model, there is a natural upper
bound for how massive the agent confusion can be: At most, a contestant can make the
agent located at the opposite end of the circle believe that they share the same location.
We show that for indecisive preferences the contestants’ payoffs in the effort stage are
inverse-U shaped in the extent of obfuscation. With polarization, we instead obtain an
interior minimum. More generally, these findings suggest that in the Salop model, firms
never desire to maximally confuse consumers in the sense that the perceived location of
17Note that the family of uniform distributions {Γa}a∈A is ranked according to the MPS ordering.
Hence Assumption 3 is only needed to assure a unique identification of the communication strategies
in the SPE featuring maximal (minimal) confusion. Further, tedious algebra shows that, Theorem 3
extends to the case where {Γa}a∈A is a general family of truncation-ordered distributions, such that the
different densities γa are again only distinguished by their supports.
18Note, however, that Theorem 3 relies on the assumption that agents do not choose an outside option.
In Section 4.4, we allow for confusion that is so large that agents may opt for the outside option ex post.
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a consumer bears no relation to his actual location.
4 Price Competition
In this section, we apply our general framework to study price competition between firms.
In Section 4.1, we motivate our general confusion framework in the context of market
competition. Section 4.2 applies the general framework to the case at hand. Section
4.3 considers welfare and regulation, dealing in particular with pitfalls of competition-
enhancing regulation. In Section 4.4, we study the case of a binding outside option, and
relate our model to the empirical literature on choice overload. Section 4.5 shows that
our model applies to a situation where consumers differ in their degree of sophistication.
Section 4.6 connects our approach to the advertising literature.
4.1 Consumer Perception Errors: Sources
Marketing, consumer research, perceptual psychology and neuroscience provide evidence
of confusion that is consistent with the reduced-form (1) we use for our analysis. In the
following, we provide an intuitive discussion of this evidence. In Appendix S.1 we show
more rigorously how to formalize the respective notions in terms of our framework.
A large literature in marketing has documented consumer confusion resulting from
information overload. Overload confusion occurs once consumers are “confronted with
more product information and alternatives than they can process in order to get to know,
to compare and to comprehend alternatives” (Walsh et al., 2007).19 The general conse-
quences of information overload, surveyed by Eppler and Mengis (2004) across fields as
diverse as accounting, organizational science, marketing and consumer research, are un-
systematic decision mistakes, a decreased decision accuracy, a lack of critical evaluation,
a “failure to develop correct interpretations of various facets of a product or service”
(Turnbull et al., 2000), and ambiguous perceptions by consumers (Solomon et al., 2014).
More generally, the fact that confusion can have heterogeneous effects on the perceptions
by different agents is consistent with well-established psychometric research on percep-
tual errors (Murray, 1993). Jacoby (1977) and Malhotra (1982) are among the first to
point out that consumer confusion due to information overload emerges when choosing
between complex products, where complexity is related to the number of attributes or
19The idea is rooted in psychology and neuroscience, where it is well understood that people make
decision mistakes once the amount of the information they are exposed to surpasses a certain threshold
(see, e.g., Miller, 1956).
18
surrounding marketing messages. Complexity confusion has been found in computers,
mobile phones, automobiles, digital cameras, buildings or insurance policies (see Walsh
et al., 2007; Kasabov, 2015; Mützel and Kilian, 2016), and has been associated with prod-
uct packaging (Mitchell and Papavassiliou, 1999), or lengthy and complicated contracts
involving “fine print” (see, e.g., Turnbull et al. (2000) for the case of mobile phones).
The emphasis of our model on relative valuations allows for the possibility that com-
munication strategies not only affect the perceived valuation for a firm’s own good, but
also for the competitor’s good. For instance, if one food brand uses the label “original”
while another brand uses “authentic”, consumers may be confused when comparing the
brands (see e.g., Langer et al. (2007) for the confusing role of labels). In such cases,
the valuations of the goods may be interdependent, rather than i.i.d.20 In addition, the
possibility that a communication strategy of a firm also affects the evaluation of the com-
petitor’s good is consistent with the approach of authors such as Carlin (2009), Piccione
and Spiegler (2012), Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) or Spiegler (2014). These authors study
homogeneous goods models where the mutual choice of a “frame”, i.e., a way to present
the price of a product, determines whether or not a consumer can compare products. The
notion of framing can be incorporated into our setting by assuming that communication
profiles induce a probability distribution over the different frames a consumer could adopt
to compare the products (see Appendix S.1 for details).21
4.2 Main Results with Price Competition
The model of price competition and zero marginal-cost firms can be captured within our
framework by specifying S = (−∞, 0] and R(si, sj) = −si, C(si) = 0, and let pi = −si
be the price set by firm i. We conveniently refer to the effort stage as the pricing stage
of the game. To apply the results from Section 3, we need to verify that the conditions
in Assumption 1 are satisfied. (A1.3) always holds because
z(s) = − 1
2s
, and R1(s, s) +R2(s, s)− 2C ′(s) = −1 < 0, ∀s = −p ≤ 0.
20This is consistent with the view that complexity is a synthetic phenomenon of all marketing messages
interacting with each other, leading to a market level or “category complexity” (Mützel and Kilian, 2016).
21We could also have assumed that communication strategies amount to choosing the presentation of
the final price (“price format”) εa, rather than (gross) match advantages as in (1). Then, the perceived
price advantage of firm i = 2 by consumer k is pk∆ + εa, p
k
∆ ≡ p1 − p2. That is, while consumers
perceive the true possible price advantage of a firm with noise, each firm sets a deterministic price which
a purchasing consumer in the end needs to pay. If price formats are chosen in the first stage and prices
in the second, the model is formally equivalent to the one we studied. See Grubb (2015) for survey on
models with noisy prices.
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The following proposition provides a simple set of sufficient conditions on the distribution
functions G0 and Ga assuring that (A1.1) and (A1.2) hold, allowing us to identify the
unique symmetric pure-strategy price equilibrium of the pricing stage.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied: (i) G0 is log-concave
on supp(g0); (ii) g0 is continuous at zero and g0(0) > 0; (iii) If εa 6= O, it has a density
γa that is log-concave on supp(γa). Then Assumption 1 holds, and every subgame in the
pricing stage has a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium where both firms choose
the price p∗a =
1
2ga(0)
, ∀a ∈ A.
The log-concavity conditions (i) and (iii) assure the strict quasiconcavity of the payoff
(A1.1). Jointly with the technical condition (ii), the requirement that εa has a density
function whenever it is not degenerate implies (A1.2), assuring that the equilibrium prices
p∗ are well-defined.
Proposition 1 directly shows that the equilibrium price p∗a is determined by and de-
creasing in ga(0), the measure of perceptually indifferent consumers. Since higher prices
correspond to higher profits, firms prefer communication profiles that reduce the measure
of perceptually indifferent consumers, consistent with Lemma 1. Based on this insight,
it is straightforward to translate Theorems 1-3 to the price competition setting. In par-
ticular, SPE without consumer confusion exist for weak polarization, but not for weak
indecisiveness. With stronger indecisiveness (polarization) conditions and suitable disper-
sion orders of the noise induced by the communication strategies, there is a unique SPE
with maximal (minimal) confusion. Finally, if massive confusion is possible, confusion
arises even with polarized preferences.22
Reflecting the logic of the general analysis, equilibrium forces push both firms to
compete for the perceptually indifferent and therefore most price-sensitive consumers.
If ga(0) is low, there are only few such consumers. Thus, consistent with empirical
observations (Ellison and Ellison, 2009), obfuscation is an effective means to lower price
elasticities and increase markups if either tastes are indecisive or obfuscation can become
massive (e.g., because products are near to homogeneous).
Competition on the line We now apply Proposition 1 to a well-known textbook
example. Suppose that each consumer is characterized by a parameter θ ∈ Θ = [−1, 1],
22Note that for any fixed support of preferences [−v, v], firms always desire match advantages that
are distributed in a polarized way, as these distributions soften competition most (see also Armstrong
and Zhou, 2019). However, it is not possible to induce such distributions by means of confusion if true
preferences are indecisive.
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which is drawn from a commonly known distribution H with zero-symmetric density













. The true match value of a
type θ consumer for product i ∈ {1, 2} is vθi = µ − (xi − θ)2, where µ > 0 is sufficiently
large, and x1 = −1, x2 = 1 are the locations of the firms. Thus, θ can be interpreted
as the location of the consumer on a (Hotelling) line, where the true match value is
determined by a quadratic distance function. H translates into a distribution G0 of true
match advantages, where G0(x) = H(
x
4
) ∀x ∈ R. If α > 0, the true match values are
strongly polarized on the support of G0, [−4, 4]. Conversely, if α < 0, the true match
values are strongly indecisive on [−4, 4]. More generally, |α| corresponds to the extent
of polarization or indecisiveness, respectively. To capture obfuscation, suppose that the
error distribution is uniformly distributed on an interval [−ωa, ωa] where ωa < 4 ∀a ∈ A,
i.e., confusion cannot be massive.
Proposition 1 applies to this example.23 Thus, a symmetric price equilibrium exists,
given by p∗a =
1
2ga(0)
. This example allows to explicitly derive ga(0), which yields
p∗a =
288
αω2a + 72− 48α
> 0 (3)
as equilibrium price. It is easily seen from (3) that the equilibrium price (and thus payoffs)
increase in ωa if α < 0 (indecisiveness), and decrease if α > 0 (polarization), confirming
the results from Theorems 1 and 2 under the respective assumptions on A.24
The Logit model The Logit model is among the most frequently used models for the
theoretical and empirical analysis of discrete choice. It is well known that whenever true
tastes are described by a linear random utility model with an i.i.d. Gumbel distribution, a
Logit demand system results (see Anderson et al., 1992). In such a case, the distribution
of the true match advantages, v∆, follows a zero-mean logistic distribution. As this type
of distribution is zero-symmetric, log-concave and features (global) indecisiveness on R,
our main analysis directly implies that only SPE featuring agent confusion can exist in a
Logit context.
4.3 Welfare Implications
In a homogeneous goods setting, consumer confusion increases prices, and firms benefit
at the expense of consumers. In our setting, goods are differentiated (v∆ 6= O), so that
23In particular, the parameter restriction on α assures the sufficiency of first-order conditions in the
pricing stage; for details, see Proposition A1 in Appendix A.2.
24In the knife-edge case of uniformly distributed consumers (α = 0), confusion has no price effect
(unless it may become massive).
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consumer confusion could, in principle, reduce prices. However, in such a case (when pref-
erences are polarized), firms avoid obfuscating the market according to Theorems 1 and
2. More importantly, confusion can lead to inefficiency with differentiated goods, because
some consumers might acquire a dominated product. For any equilibrium communication




xΓa∗(−x)g0(x)dx ≥ 0. (4)
To understand (4), note that, if a consumer chooses the dominated option, the welfare
loss is |v2− v1|, i.e., the absolute difference of her true match values. Let x = v2− v1 > 0
w.l.o.g. Then, g0(x) is the likelihood of type x and Γa∗(−x) is the probability that type x
buys from the wrong firm. Expression (4) shows that equilibrium consumer confusion is
necessary and sufficient for a positive welfare loss (L > 0) to occur. In view of the results
in Sections 3.2 - 3.4, indecisive preferences imply an inefficient equilibrium outcome, while
no such inefficiency arises with polarized preferences, as least as long confusion cannot
become massive.
In Appendix S.4, we elaborate on the size of the welfare loss in the case of indecisive
preferences. Specifically, we establish the intuitive result that the welfare loss (4) is
monotonically increasing in the size of confusion if confusion follows a uniform distribution
as in Proposition 3. In addition, we show in the example with competition on the line
that an increase in the indecisiveness of preferences (captured by increasing |α|) has an
ambiguous effect on welfare.25
Regarding welfare, our analysis further informs the evaluation of regulations aimed at
increasing competition between incumbent firms.26 An example is a compulsory product
standard or norm which increases the true similarity between products. In the example
with competition on the line, such a regulation can be captured as a relocation of both
firms towards the middle or, more precisely, as a truncation of the true match advantage
distribution G0. More generally, let supp g0 = [−λ, λ], where λ > 0 captures the true
extent of product differentiation. Consider a policy with the effect of reducing this dif-
ferentiation to supp gr0 = [−r, r], 0 < r < λ, where gr0 is a truncation of g0.27 Absent any
25The ambiguity follows from two competing effects. As |α| increases, more almost indifferent con-
sumers buy the wrong product, but at the same time, these welfare losses are rather low. The former
effect dominates (and the welfare loss increases in |α|) only if obfuscation possibilities are large enough
relative to true differentiation.
26In different settings, Spiegler (2006) and Hefti (2018) show that facilitating firm entry with bound-
edly rational consumers may lead to inefficiency.
27In the previous example with quadratic transportation costs, it is easy to see that if the new firm




consumer confusion, it is easy to see that such a regulation successfully lowers equilib-
rium prices, as gr0(0) > g0(0), independent of the shape of g0. The following result shows
that, depending on consumer preferences, such regulations may have unintended, adverse
effects on welfare due to consumer confusion.28
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied, and consider the regu-
lation with 0 < r < λ outlined above. (i) If true preferences are strongly indecisive on
supp g0 and supp γa ⊂ [−r, r], ∀a ∈ A, the regulation strictly increases the welfare loss
due to consumer confusion. (ii) If true preferences are polarized on supp g0, the regulation
has no adverse welfare effects, unless possibly if confusion becomes massive.
Intuitively, the qualitative shape of the true match advantage distribution is invariant
to the above type of regulation. Therefore, the regulation does not affect whether or
not confusion takes place by Theorem 2, at least as long as the scope of confusion is
limited. However, when confusion does take place (i.e., with indecisive preferences), more
consumers will be confused for any given valuation difference as the distribution of match
advantages becomes more concentrated, while firms nevertheless obfuscate at maximal
intensity. This implies that more consumers choose a dominated product following the
regulation. By contrast, firms continue to educate consumers with polarized preferences,
at least as long as massive confusion is infeasible.
Similar reasoning applies to changes in the environment that are not policy-induced.
For instance, pundits believed that the Internet would lead to the “the death of distance”
(Cairncross, 1997) in banking competition, as the possibility of online transactions was
expected to dramatically reduce the importance of (geographical) distance between banks.
By contrast, our model predicts that banks, competing in interest rates for depositors,
are likely to counter such increasing competitive pressure by obfuscating the market.29
This is consistent with the fact that, indeed, a pro-competitive effect of the Internet has
not been observed in the data (Degryse and Ongena, 2005).
4.4 Abstaining from Purchases
The marketing literature has emphasized that confused consumers may inefficiently ab-
stain from buying at all (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004; Eppler and
∀x ∈ [−4r, 4r].
28We focus entirely on consumer confusion as a new channel of inefficiency, leaving aside potential
additional effects caused by the change of differentiation itself.
29As argued in Section 2 (see footnote 10), it is relatively straightforward to adopt our framework to
capture such strategic competition in interest rates between banks.
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Mengis, 2004; Bertrand et al., 2010; Chernev et al., 2015).30 Consistent with this empiri-
cal observation, we next show that in the presence of binding outside options, firms may
choose a confusing communication strategy even though this induces some consumers
to exit the market. This provides an additional rationale for why the market does not
eliminate confusion and its negative consequences.
In the spirit of the Hotelling model, suppose that the perceived match values are





and ṽ2 = 1 − υ2 −
ε
2
, where υ ∈ [−1, 1] is governed by a zero-
symmetric distribution G0 with density g0. Further, all consumers have a reservation
value normalized to zero. Thus, a consumer purchases the good with the higher perceived
net value ṽj − pj if this net value is non-negative, and does not purchase otherwise.31
Compared to the previous analysis, each firm must take into account that a price increase
may now come at the additional cost of losing some consumers to whom the firm actually
is offering the better deal. The threat of exiting consumers becomes pertinent if prices
are high. Therefore it is conceivable that the possibility of a binding outside option may
discipline firms against obfuscating too much, e.g., in case of indecisive preferences.
In the following, we explain the main equilibrium patterns predicted by the above
model intuitively; see Appendix S.3 for a formal analysis. Figure 4 illustrates second-
stage prices, firm demand and payoff if G0 follows a simple “tent” distribution on [−1, 1]
(i.e., true preferences are indecisive),32 and {Γa}a∈A is given by a family of uniform
distributions that differ in their support [−ω, ω], ω ≥ 0. As in Section 3.4 the parameter
ω captures the intensity of confusion in a market. The figure shows that the equilibrium
price and profit both are globally increasing functions of ω, and strictly so if ω is small
(ω < 1) or large (ω > 2) enough. In particular, equilibrium profits remain increasing in
ω despite an increasing fraction of exiting consumers.
The intuition behind the figure is as follows. As long as obfuscation cannot reduce the
measure of perceptionally indifferent consumers enough (ω ≤ 1), prices remain so low that
the outside option does not bind in equilibrium. In this case, the analysis is identical to the
one of our main model: More confusion (a larger value of ω) increases prices and profits
without reducing demand. For ω > 1, the outside option may become binding for some
30In particular, the literature noted that product complexity, rather than the sheer number of prod-
ucts, is decisive for whether such “choice overload” emerges (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Lee and Lee,
2004; Scheibehenne et al., 2010; Chernev et al., 2015).
31 In the above formulation, the true match values are (perfectly) negatively correlated, which implies
that the distribution of the true match advantages, v∆ = −υ, also is given by g0. This property makes
the formal analysis sufficiently tractable. Further, the normalization supp(g0) = [−1, 1] is not essential,
but simplifies the presentation of results.

























Figure 4: (a) Price, (b) demand, and (c) payoff as a function of ω
consumers. Thus, the firms need to strategically balance the corresponding loss in demand
against the benefits of higher prices. For intermediate confusion (1 < ω < 2), this leads
firms to choose their prices exactly such that no consumer decides to leave the market. By
contrast, with sufficiently large confusion (ω > 2) the competition for the perceptionally
indifferent consumers softens so that the higher prices eventually compensate for the loss
in demand.33 In such a situation, firms increasingly exploit consumers with the most
favorable views of their products at the cost of losing some less favorable consumers.
Figure 4 implies that, whenever obfuscation possibilities are sufficiently large (ω > 2
is feasible), then a communication profile inducing maximal obfuscation must be part
of an SPE.34 Thus, our model rationalizes the possibility that consumers erroneously
choose the outside option as an event that firms are willing to accept as part of their
profit-maximizing strategies. Put differently, a binding outside option does not generally
discipline firms against using confusing communication strategies; equilibrium payoffs
overall are weakly increasing in ω, and become flat only for intermediate values of ω.
Moreover, such firm behavior creates an additional source of market inefficiency, besides
the inefficiency originating from the mismatch between some consumers and firms.
4.5 Consumer Sophistication
In research with behavioral agents, the population is frequently partitioned into two types:
the “naive” and the “sophisticated”, where the latter do not exhibit any behavioral bias.
We now demonstrate that our main results also apply in the presence of agents with
different degrees of sophistication. Let naiveté be an exogenous trait that is dispersed
33In this case, each firm prices as if it were a monopolist constrained only by the possibility that some
consumers choose not to purchase the good.
34This result holds more generally, as we show in Appendix S.3.
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over the consumer population according to the random variable ρ, such that ṽ∆(a) =
v∆ + ρεa, where supp ρ ⊂ [0, 1], and ρ, v∆ and εa are independent for any given a ∈
A. A consumer with ρ = 0 is fully sophisticated, meaning that her perceptions are
unaffected by the chosen communication strategies: ṽ∆(a) = v∆ ∀a ∈ A. By contrast,
a larger value of ρ means less sophistication in that the possible distortions induced by
εa are amplified.
35 Alternatively, ρ can be seen as a measure for the level of “confusion
proneness” as introduced by Walsh et al. (2007), capturing that different consumers may
be differ in how susceptible they are to obfuscation techniques. It is straightforward to
use first-order conditions to verify that p∗a =
1
2ĝa(0)
results in the pricing stage, where
ĝa(0) =
∫ ∫
g0(ρ̃ε̃)dΓa(ε̃)dΓρ(ρ̃) and Γρ denotes the distribution function of ρ.
36 It is
evident from this expression that the main firm-side incentives to obfuscate or educate
still depend exclusively on the shape of g0.
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4.6 Relation to the Advertising Literature
One interpretation of our results is that more precise information about the products
increases prices and profits with indecisive preferences, but decreases them with polar-
ized preferences. This contrasts with familiar results from the literature on informative
advertising, surveyed in Bagwell (2007), where more information provided by firms typi-
cally reduces prices by intensifying competition. Our paper also relates to the literature
on persuasive advertising, which emphasizes that persuasive advertising games have the
structure of a prisoners’ dilemma: Firms engage in costly advertising races, which, in
equilibrium, do not affect prices and gross profits (see, e.g., Dixit and Norman, 1978;
Von der Fehr and Stevik, 1998; Bagwell, 2007). In our setting, obfuscating communica-
tion strategies can be interpreted as activities that persuade some consumers at the cost
of alienating others.38 Our analysis shows that firms either refrain from such advertising
measures (with polarized consumers) or use the measures to soften competition (with
35The information may be so complex that it cannot be fully assessed even by sophisticated agents
(Eichenberger and Serna, 1996), in which case ρ > 0.
36The typical case of binary types occurs if all probability mass of Γρ rests on ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, which
yields ĝa(0) = Γρ(0)ga(0) + (1− Γρ(0))g0(0).
37In our framework, naive consumers impose a negative externality on sophisticated ones, independent
of the shape of the preference distribution. This is because, in any case, the equilibrium measures taken by
firms are such as to either confuse or educate the naive consumers, which increases the equilibrium price
for sophisticated consumers as well. In fact, the desire for consumer education of firms and sophisticated
consumers are exactly antipodal to each other.
38As an example, consider the cold-calls of tele-marketing agents (see Schumacher and Thysen, 2017).
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indecisive consumers), which contrasts with the prisoners’ dilemma situations.39
Finally, our results are related to Johnson and Myatt (2006), who show that a monop-
olist does not necessarily want to engage in measures related to advertising, marketing or
product design that increase the heterogeneity of consumer valuations. In their monopoly
analysis, the entire distribution of valuations matters for the optimal pricing strategy of
a monopolist, while in our setting, in the absence of outside options the competitive
forces imply that equilibrium prices depend only on the mass of perceptually indifferent
consumers. Firms always desire more consumer heterogeneity in the sense of fewer indif-
ferent and hence highly price-sensitive consumers. Our main result that the shape of the
true match advantage distribution determines whether such heterogeneity is achievable
by means of obfuscation or education has no counterpart in Johnson and Myatt (2006).
5 Competition for Voters
Communication strategies play a major role in political competition. A substantial liter-
ature has asked why political candidates often choose ambiguous platforms, rather than
describe their policies exactly. In the standard Hotelling-Downs framework of political
competition, ambiguous platforms indeed are always suboptimal when voters are risk-
averse (Shepsle, 1972). By contrast, some authors have argued that ambiguity may be
preferable, e.g., because it allows political candidates to maintain the flexibility to adapt
to future circumstances (Aragones and Neeman, 2000; Kartik et al., 2017), while others
have provided behavioral explanations, relying on context-dependent preferences (Callan-
der and Wilson, 2008) or projection bias (Jensen, 2009).We contribute to the literature
on strategic ambiguity in political competition by studying how the incentives of political
candidates to confuse or educate potential voters about their platforms depend on the
heterogeneity of true voter preferences. In Section 5.1, we directly apply our general
analysis to the case of symmetric candidates. In Section 5.2, we relax the assumptions of
perfectly symmetric contestants and unbiased perception errors.
5.1 Symmetric Political Parties
We consider the specification of the general model with R(s1, s2) = 1 and C(si) = ks
η
i ,
∀s1, s2 ∈ S = R+, where k > 0 and η > 1. Here, we interpret the market share as
the share of votes, and we assume that the two political contestants, henceforth simply
referred to as “parties”, value the votes symmetrically. Parties are heterogeneous with
39It is easy to show that our results would qualitatively apply if we introduced obfuscation costs.
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respect to their ideology, and voters have heterogeneous preferences over policies, captured
by the distribution G0 of true match advantages. Voters evaluate a party according to
their perceived match advantages. The distribution of perceived match advantages, Ga, is
determined by the parties’ communication strategies (a1, a2).
40 In particular, a party can
avoid being precise, leading to a noisy perception, whereby some voters get a too positive
impression of the party’s value for them and others get a too negative impression. Parties
not only influence election outcomes by their platforms. In addition, it is well known that
the prominence in the media of a party has a strong persuasive effect on voting behavior.
For instance, a candidate’s comparative advantage in media exposure can lead undecided
voters to favor him (Gerber et al., 2011; Gallego and Schofield, 2017). We capture this
observation by interpreting si as advertising efforts, where the party with si > sj is more
prominent and, consequently, wins more undecided voters.
Contrary to price reductions, efforts in this setting are unconditional, that is, they
arise independent of the contestants’ success in attracting market share. Nevertheless, our
main insights about how the chosen communication strategies relate to the true dispersion
of preferences carry over to political competition. Under suitable parameter restrictions
(see Appendix A2), the equilibrium effort level s∗a is described by the first-order equilib-
rium equation ga(0) = C
′(s∗a). Hence, s
∗
a is strictly increasing and equilibrium payoffs
are strictly decreasing in the mass of perceptually indifferent voters ga(0), reflecting in-
creasing equilibrium effort levels and advertising expenditures .41 Both parties therefore
have a clear incentive to evade such intense competition. If Assumptions 2 and 3 hold,
candidates will choose ambiguous platforms if preferences are indecisive (but not if they
are polarized). In other words, a situation with indecisive preferences, i.e., with many
truly undecided voters, provides a breeding ground for voter confusion.
5.2 Asymmetric Contestants
While our model allows for ex-post asymmetry of the contestants (after the choice of
efforts), it assumes that they are symmetric ex ante (before the choice of communication
strategies) and ex interim (between the choices of communication and efforts). We next
elaborate on the robustness of the main insights of our paper with respect to these
40We can use higher values of ai to capture greater ambiguity due to, for example, a larger set
of policies (which leads to a larger support of the perceived match advantages), as is common in the
literature.
41This is a special case of Lemma 1. We formally show in Appendix A.3 (see Proposition A2) that a













Figure 5: The effects of confusion with ex-ante asymmetric contestants indecisiveness
symmetry assumptions in the context of the voting model; similar reasoning applies to
the price competition case.
Ex-ante asymmetry We first show that, with ex-ante asymmetric contestants, the
shape of preferences has a similar effect on the nature of equilibrium as in the symmetric
case. Suppose that i = 1 is a strong and i = 2 a weak contestant in the sense that
C ′1(s) < C
′
2(s) for any s > 0. For a given distribution of perceived match advantages
Ga, the first-order conditions in the effort stage yield ga(s1 − s2) = C ′1(s1) = C ′2(s2),
showing that marginal costs are equated by equilibrium forces. It follows that we must
have s1 − s2 ≡ s∆ > 0 in equilibrium, reflecting the advantage of the strong contestant.
Because then also Ga(s∆) > 1/2, it follows that, despite unbiased perception errors,
communication can lead to a redistribution of market shares and thereby possibly induce
a conflict of interests between the contestants. Figure 5 illustrates the effects of agent
confusion for indecisive preferences.42
As captured in the left part of Figure 5, agent confusion spreads out the density of
the perceived match values ga below g0, and accordingly rotates the distribution Ga at 0
clockwise (displayed in the right part of Figure 5). On the one hand, both contestants
benefit from confusion because the downward shift of ga softens competition and allows
them to choose lower equilibrium efforts. On the other hand, as we can see from the
right part of Figure 5, the market share of the strong (weak) contestant would be larger
(smaller) without agent confusion. Therefore, the strong contestant may have a mixed
view about the benefits of agent confusion, while the weak contestant can only benefit.43
The opposite logic applies with polarized preferences. Then, agent confusion can only
harm the weak contestant because it intensifies competition, and the weak contestant
loses some otherwise favorable agents to the strong competitor. In sum, the weak com-
42The suggestive insights portrayed by Figure 5 are supported by formal results (see Appendix S.6).
43Kalaycı and Potters (2011) observe a similar result in a Hotelling model with quality-differentiated
products; also see Gabaix and Laibson (2004).
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petitor unambiguously strives to educate (to confuse) in the case of polarized (indecisive)
preferences, while the incentive is less clear-cut for the strong contestant.44
Ex-interim asymmetry Despite the many reasons suggesting an unbiased nature of
the perception errors in the voters’ comparison, the existence of communication profiles
that lead to biased comparisons is conceivable. Are such biased communication profiles
played in equilibrium provided that they are available? Do they overthrow the role of
preferences that we identified in our previous results?45 We study these questions in
Appendix S.7 in a simple extension with binary communication strategies A = {0, 1},
where aj = 0 corresponds to accurate communication, and aj = 1 to communication that
leads to noisy but biased comparisons in j’s favor given that a−j = 0. Preferences still play
a key role for whether education or confusion results with possibly biased communication
profiles: Mutual obfuscation remains the unique equilibrium with indecisive preferences,
while education remains the only equilibrium outcome with polarized preferences if the
contestants can unilaterally educate the agents, e.g., as in Heidhues et al. (2016).46
6 Conclusion
Our paper provides a theory explaining the strategic use of confusion by contestants,
such as firms or political parties, who compete for agents with heterogeneous preferences.
We find that the distribution of true agent preferences plays a decisive role for whether
contestants choose an educating or a confusing communication strategy. Agent education
emerges as an equilibrium outcome if true preferences are polarized, intuitively meaning
that tastes are concentrated near the contestants’ positions. By contrast, confusion arises
for the case of indecisive preferences, characterized by a concentration of agents who are
truly indifferent between the choice alternatives.
We also find that confusion can be an equilibrium outcome if it can be massive in the
sense that the dispersion of true preferences is narrow relative to the perception errors that
44It is easy to see that a similar result emerges if C1(s) = C2(s) but g0 is shifted to the right, such
that with equal effort, contestant i = 1 would obtain a strictly larger market share.
45Clearly, these issues are relevant for the price competition application as well: For instance, if
Duracel’s advertises its batteries as the “longest-living batteries”, then all other batteries must be short-
lived. If sufficiently many consumers are influenced by this logic, then this would be a clear case of biased
communication.
46If education cannot be forced unilaterally, two possibilities arise. With very large biases, obfuscation
becomes so attractive that contestants are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, with mutual obfuscation
as the sole equilibrium outcome. For biases of intermediate size, a coordination game results with two
asymmetric equilibria, where exactly one firm obfuscates.
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can be induced by obfuscation. In a product market setting with differentiated products,
this generalizes the central insight from behavioral industrial organization that firms
in homogeneous goods industries seek to obfuscate to escape the Bertrand trap: With
homogeneous goods any confusion must be massive in our sense. Our analysis shows that,
other than with homogeneous goods, firms do not always choose to confuse consumers,
but if they do, its welfare effects are more detrimental. In particular, consumers can
be harmed by choosing dominated options, paying higher prices or inefficiently forgoing
purchases. The latter may help to understand why the consumer decision not to purchase
any option due to confusion is a persistent empirical phenomenon.
Regulatory interventions may lead to undesired outcomes for reasons related to pref-
erence heterogeneity. For instance, regulations aiming at increasing the similarity of
products to foster competition may be inefficient, because they can end up fostering
confusion instead. Further, general restrictions of the acceptable communication strate-
gies may backfire in situations with polarized preferences, where, in the absence of such
restrictions, contestants would choose their communication to dissolve any pre-existing
agent confusion.
Applied to political competition, our analysis shows that the distribution of voter
preferences crucially affects whether parties choose ambiguous platforms: With many
undecided voters such ambiguity may help to soften political competition as it moves
the perceived valuations for the candidates towards polarization. At the same time,
we find that, with pre-existing polarization, parties prefer to educate voters about their
platforms. In sum, we find that the dispersion of preferences has similar implications for
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A.1 General Analysis: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Let a ∈ A. By (A1.2) there exists s∗a ∈ S such that z(s∗a) is
well-defined (i.e., R(s∗a, s
∗









a)ga(0)− C ′(s∗a) = 0. (A.1)
Moreover, s∗a is uniquely determined because z(s) is strictly increasing by (A1.3). Be-
cause Ga is zero-symmetric, (A.1) corresponds to the first-order condition for an interior
symmetric equilibrium in the effort stage. By strict quasi-concavity (A1.1), we may
conclude that the mutual choice of s∗a = z
−1(ga(0)) by both contestants constitutes the
unique symmetric equilibrium in the effort stage. Because z(s) is strictly increasing, the
equilibrium effort s∗a = z




R1(s, s) +R2(s, s)
2
− C ′(s) < 0,
the equilibrium payoff must be strictly decreasing in ga(0). 







g0(0)dΓa(e) = g0(0), (A.2)
where the inequality follows from supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ], the zero-symmetry of Γa, and the











0) for all a ∈ A such that εa 6= O. It then immediately follows
that any choice of a ∈ A for which εa = O must be an equilibrium of the communication




0 in the competition stage. In such SPE, communication
strategies are thus chosen such that no agent confusion results, and by (A2.1) at least
one such communication profile exists. For part (ii), the inequality in (A.2) is reversed by
weak indecisiveness of the agents’ preferences. Hence, by Lemma 1, any communication
profile with εa 6= O, followed by the symmetric equilibrium s∗a would be strictly preferred
by the contestants than the respective outcome under εa = O. (A2.2) then assures that
any possible SPE must involve agent confusion. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Part (i): By Theorem 1, for this part of the proof it is without
loss to assume that 0 /∈ A, since even if it is available the communication profile a = 0
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will not be chosen in any SPE. Take any a, a′ ∈ A such that a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′. By





= E [E [g0 (εa′) |εa]]
= E [E [g0 (εa + η) |εa]]
< E [g0 (E[εa + η|εa])]






The third line follows from the law of iterated expectations, the fourth because εa′ and
εa +η are equal in distribution, and the fifth line follows from Jensen’s inequality because
g0 is strictly concave on [−δ, δ] ⊃ supp(εa). Hence, ga(0) achieves its minimum on A if
and only if a = (ā, ā). By Lemma 1, this also maximizes the payoffs of the contestants in
the competition stage. Hence, (ā, ā) must be part of an SPE. Moreover, (ā, ā) is the only
possible equilibrium outcome, because for any alternative (a1, a2) ∈ A, a forward-looking
contestant with ai < ā would always want to deviate to ā.
Part (ii): If g0 is strictly convex, the inequality in (A.3) is reversed. By Lemma 1,
any εa′ which is MPS of εa therefore is payoff-dominated by εa. Further, any εa 6= O
trivially is an MPS of O. Thus, regardless of whether 0 ∈ A or not, a∗ = (a, a) is the
only possible equilibrium outcome. Indeed, setting ai = a is a dominant action for each
contestant i, because ∀aj ∈ A, with any alternative ai > a the resulting ε(ai,aj) is a MPS
of ε(a, aj), which can only lead to a lower equilibrium payoffs in the competition stage. 





where Γω is the uniform distribution on [−ω, ω]:
Γω(x) =

1 if x > ω,
x+ω
2ω
if x ∈ [−ω, ω],
0 otherwise.
By construction and the assumptions of the theorem, Γa(x) = Γωa(x) ∀x ∈ R, a ∈ A.
Consider first case (i). We start by showing that gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω on
[0,+∞). Since match values are indecisive on supp(g0) and g0(x) = 0 ∀x /∈ supp(g0), we
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where the inequality follows that match values are indecisive on supp(g0), g0 is zero-
symmetric, and g0(x) = 0 ∀x /∈ supp(g0). By Lemma 1, there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium in which both contestants choose the effort s∗a = z
−1(gωa(0)) following every
a ∈ A in the effort stage . Since gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω, gωa(0) is minimized
at ωa = ω̄. Therefore, the equilibrium payoff is maximized at ωa = ω̄ which, as a
consequence of Assumption 3, implies that the unique SPE features maximal confusion.
Next, consider case (ii). We first prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma A1 If supp(g0) is bounded, then limω→+∞ gω(0) = 0.
Proof. Since supp(g0) is bounded, we must have supp(g0) ⊂ [−ω, ω] for sufficiently















dε = 0. 
Lemma A2 If supp(g0) is bounded, then gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω for all ω >
sup supp(g0)
Proof. Since supp(g0) is bounded, we must have sup supp(g0) < +∞, and g0(ω) = 0
















dε < 0. 
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Now consider any match value distribution that is polarized on its support supp(g0).
By definition, g0 is strictly decreasing on (inf supp(g0), 0] and is strictly increasing on










contradicting the definition of g0 as a density function. Applying Lemmas A1 and A2,
we can conclude that limω→+∞ gω(0) = 0 and that gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω on
(supp(g0),+∞). Hence, given g0(0) > 0 there must exist ω̂ > 0, such that if ω ≥ ω̂, then
gω(0) ≤ g0(0) and it is further decreasing as ω increases. Therefore, if ω̄ is sufficiently
large, the subgame equilibrium payoff is maximized at ωa = ω̄ which, by Assumption 3,
implies that the unique SPE then features maximal confusion. 
A.2 Price Competition: Proofs and Additional Results
Proof of Proposition 1 First, we argue that the log-concavity assumptions in (i) and
(iii) imply that each firm i’s expected payoff Πai (pi, pj) = piGa(pj − pi) is strictly quasi-
concave in pi, ∀a ∈ A and pj ≥ 0. To see this, first note that ∀a ∈ A, the distribution




G0(x− ε)dΓa(ε),∀x ∈ R,
is log-concave on supp(ga). This is trivial if εa = O, since in this case we have Ga = G0,
and G0 is log-concave on supp(g0) as condition (i) assumes. If εa 6= O, then by (iii) it has
a log-concave density γa, and we thus have Ga(x) =
∫
supp(εa)
G0(x − ε)γa(ε)dε,∀x ∈ R.
Then, we can again conclude that Ga is log-concave on supp(ga), because the convolution
of log-concave functions is also log-concave.47 Further, since the function f(p) = p is
strictly log-concave on [0,+∞), for all pj ≥ 0 the profit function Πai (pi, pj) is strictly





every p2 ≥ 0, we define
p(p2) ≡ sup {p1 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 1} , and p̄(p2) ≡ inf {p1 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 0} ,
and similarly, for every p1 > 0,
p(p1) ≡ sup {p2 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 0} , and p̄(p1) ≡ inf {p2 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 1} .
47For an overview of the properties of log-concave distributions, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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Since Πai (pi, pj) = pi is strictly increasing if pi ≤ max{p(pj), 0}, and Πai (pi, pj) = 0
∀pi ≥ p̄(pj), we can conclude that ∀pj ≥ 0, Πai (pi, pj) is strictly quasic-concave in pi on
the entire domain [0,+∞).
Next, we prove that (A1.2) is satisfied. Since in the current setting we have
z(s) = − 1
2s
∀s = −p ≤ 0,
it suffices to show that ga(0) > 0 ∀a ∈ A. If εa = O, then ga(0) = g0(0) > 0 as condition
(ii) directly implies. If εa 6= O, then again by (iii) it has a density γa which is log-concave
on its support. By definition, it follows that supp(γa) must be a convex set, i.e., an
interval on R. It then follows that 0 ∈ supp(γa), for if 0 /∈ supp(γa) then supp(γa) must
reside entirely either in (−∞, 0) or in (0,∞), contradicting the symmetry of Γa at zero.
The zero-symmetry of Γa further assures that supp(γa) is an interval symmetric around
zero. By (ii), g0 is continuous and strictly positive at the point x = 0. Hence, there must
exist δ > 0 such that g0(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [−δ, δ]. In particular, we can choose this δ > 0 so








The existence of a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in every subgame then
immediately follows from Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) Because g0(·, r) is strongly indecisive on its support, the
only SPE involves maximal confusion by Theorem 2. Let L(a, r) denote the welfare loss









xΓa(−x)g0(x)dx = L(a, λ),
showing that the welfare loss increases for r < λ. For (ii), note that the unique SPE
involves full education also under the regulation as long as supp γa ⊂ supp g0(·, r), ∀a ∈ A,
by Theorem 2, meaning that L(0, r) = L(0, λ) = 0. If the regulation leads to a sufficiently
tight support of g0(·, r), then Theorem 3 shows that maximal confusion becomes the
unique SPE, at least if {Γa}a∈A is given by a family of uniform distributions. 
Proposition A1 Consider the model with competition on the line. Suppose that α ≤
α̂ ≡ (6− 3
√
3)/4λ3, (A1.3) holds, and supp(γa) ⊂ [−4λ2, 4λ2] ∀a ∈ A.
(i) If Assumption 2 also holds, then there exists (does not exist) an SPE without con-
sumer confusion if α > 0 (α < 0).
41
(ii) If Assumption 3 also holds and α 6= 0, then there exists a unique SPE. This SPE
features minimal (maximal) consumer confusion if α > 0 (α < 0).
Proof of Proposition A1 We start by arguing that if α ≤ α̂, then (A1.1) holds, that
is, G0 is log-concave on its support. To show this, we will make use of Lemma A3 below,
which states that H is log-concave on its support if α ≤ α̂.
Lemma A3 If α ≤ α̂, then H is log-concave on [−λ, λ].
Proof. If α ≤ 0, the statement of the lemma immediately follows because in these
cases the density function h is log-concave, which is sufficient (but not necessary) for the
distribution function H to be log-concave on [−λ, λ].
Suppose now that α ∈ (0, α̂]. We will show that H remains to be log-concave despite
that the density function h is actually log-convex. By continuity, it suffices to show that
H is log-concave on the open interval (−λ, λ). Since h is differentiable on (−λ, λ), H is
log-concave on this interval if and only if for all θ ∈ (−λ, λ),















α2θ4 + 2αβθ2 + αθ ≤ α2θ4 + β2 + 2αβθ2
⇐⇒ − 1
3









Given that α > 0, the inequality obviously holds when θ ≤ 0. But given that θ > 0, the







α2θ3 + α ≥ −4
3
α2λ3 + α > 0,
where the last inequality holds as α̂ < 3/(4λ3). Hence, inequality (B.1) holds for all
θ ∈ (−λ, λ) if and only if
− 1
3








































∀x ∈ R, and the function
t(x) = x/(4λ) is increasing and concave in x, G0 is log-concave on [4λa, 4λb] if H is log-
concave on [a, b] ⊂ R. Hence, by Lemma A3, G0 is log-concave on [−4λ2, 4λ2] provided
that α ≤ α̂.
It is straightforward to check that all other conditions in Assumption 1 are satisfied.
Hence, by Lemma 1, we can conclude that there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium




The statements of the proposition then immediately follow from Theorems 1 and 2. 
A.3 Political Competition: Formal Analysis
The following proposition presents sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric
second-stage equilibrium in efforts in the model of Section 5.
Proposition A2 Consider the voting application and suppose that the following con-




∣∣ ≤ M ; (ii) If εa 6= O, it has a density γa; (iii) ∀a ∈ A,
C ′−1(ga(0)) < max{k, 1/k}. Then there exists η∗ such that if η ≥ η∗, every subgame
in the competition stage has a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, where both
candidates choose the effort s∗a = C
′−1(ga(0)) ∀a ∈ A.
Proof of Proposition A2 First, note that since
Πai (max{k, 1/k}, sj) ≤ 1− k(max{k, 1/k})η ≤ 0,
no candidate will ever choose an effort level higher than max{k, 1/k}. We now argue that
if η is sufficiently large, then Πai (si, sj) is strictly quasi-concave in si ∈ [0,max{k, 1/k}],
∀sj ∈ R+, a ∈ A and i = 1, 2. This will be proved by using the well-known fact that
a twice differentiable real-valued function f , defined on some open interval X ⊂ R, is
strictly quasi-concave if f ′(x) = 0 implies f ′′(x) < 0 for any x ∈ X.
Take any a ∈ A and s2 ∈ R+. Note that by conditions (i) and (ii),
ga(s1 − s2) =
∫
supp(εa)
g0(s1 − s2 − ε)dΓa(ε)
is differentiable. Now suppose that
∂Πa1(s1,s2)
∂s1
= 0, for some s1 ∈ (0,max{k, 1/k}), i.e.,





= g′a(s1 − s2)− kη(η − 1)s
η−2
1
= g′a(s1 − s2)− (η − 1)ga(s1 − s2)s−11 .
Since (C.1) also implies that ga(s1− s2) > 0, we further have ∂
2Πa1(s1,s2)
∂s21




< η − 1. (C.2)
By condition (i) and s < max{k, 1/k}, the LHS of (C.2) is bounded from above by
max{kM,M/k}. Thus the inequality (C.2) must hold whenever η is sufficiently large, im-
plying that Πai (si, sj) is strictly quasi-concave in si on the open interval (0,max{k, 1/k}).
By continuity, it is also strictly quasi-concave on [0,max{k, 1/k}].
Next, from the first-order conditions, we obtain a unique candidate for a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium, where s1 = s2 = s
∗
a = C
′−1(ga(0)). By condition (iii), s
∗
a <
max{k, 1/k}. Hence, (s1, s2) = (s∗a, s∗a) is indeed an equilibrium when Πai (si, sj) is strictly




This appendix contains a number of extensions of the main analysis. In Section S.1, we
elaborate on the foundations for the perceived match advantages (1). In Section S.2, we
present the two-sided single crossing ordering of the perception errors, and show that it
implies similar results as the MPS ordering. Section S.3 formally analyzes the model with
outside option from Section 4.4, and Section S.4 elaborates on the size of the welfare loss
due to confusion in the context of price competition. In Section S.5, we study confusion
about needs in case of a Salop model, as discussed informally at the end of Section 3.4.
Finally, Sections S.6 and S.7 consider the cases of ex-ante and ex-interim asymmetric
contestants, respectively.
S.1 Decision Noise: Examples and Foundations
In this section, we provide several different foundations for our framework based on
insights from psychology, cognitive science and marketing. We will illustrate some leading
examples in the following general random utility setting. Suppose that the perceived
match values of the agents for a contestant i ∈ {1, 2} are distributed according to ṽi =
vi + εi(a), where vi is the distribution of true valuations for contestant i over the agent
population, εi(a) is a random variable, and a ∈ A is a communication profile. Then,
the distribution of the perceived match advantages of contestant i = 2 is given by (1)
with v∆ ≡ v2 − v1 and εa ≡ ε2(a) − ε1(a).48 For easy reference, we let Ĥ denote the
set of all random variables with a 0-symmetric and log-concave density function. As
before, O denotes a constant random variable that yields x = 0 with probability one, and
H ≡ Ĥ ∪O.
Product Complexity and Information Overload The intuitive arguments from
Section 4.1 about overload confusion, e.g., due to product complexity in terms of lengthy
contracts, numerous marketing messages or product attributes can be easily expressed
with a random utility model. Suppose that each contestant can choose a number of
“features” to implement in the marketing process. Each feature involves imperfect mental
information processing due to cognitive capacity limitations, which results in a noisy
48This decomposition of εa is suitable for some but not all examples we develop below. In this respect,
it is helpful to note that expressing the effects of communication strategies directly in terms of εa, rather
than via ε2(a)− ε1(a), is without loss of generality in the sense that any given zero-symmetric random
variable can always be decomposed as a sum of two zero-symmetric random variables, and vice-versa
(Rubin and Sellke, 1986).
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attribution of the product’s valuation, where some agents overestimate the value of a
given feature to them, whereas others underestimate it.49 Then, confusion due to product
complexity can be captured in a simple way by assuming that each implemented feature
has an i.i.d. effect on an agent’s evaluation of the product, determined by a random






where εj(nj) ∈ H if nj > 0, and εj(0) is degenerate.50 Then, the number of features
implemented (nj ≥ 0) corresponds to the communication strategy of contestant j. The
broad meaning of (S.1) is that more features result in more unsystematic perception
errors across agents.51 If ε1, ε2 are independent and determined by (S.1), then ε(n1, n2) ≡
ε2(n2) − ε1(n1) ∈ H, and ε(n1, n2) ∈ Ĥ iff n1 + n2 > 0. Because ε(n′1, n′2) is a mean-




2 > n1 +n2, the type of obfuscation process
captured by (S.1) has the additional feature that the resulting distributions ε can be
ordered in the sense of MPS.52
A possible limitation of the above model is that in reality different features may affect
consumer perception differentially, possibly with dependencies across features. We can
adapt the model to encompass the case of possible dependencies among the implemented
features. Formally, let Z = {Z1, ...ZK} denote a set of random variables, where the
random vector (Z1, ..., ZK) has a joint density function f(z1, ..., zK) that is coordinate-
wise symmetric, i.e.
f(z1, ..., zk, ..., zK) = f(z1, ...,−zk, ..., zK), ∀(z1, ..., zK) ∈ supp(f),∀k = 1, ..., K.
A communication strategy corresponds to a selection Mj ⊂ Z of features implemented





49Unsystematic evaluation errors resulting from sufficiently rich information stimuli due to cognitive
limitations are a well established fact for human behavior at least since Miller (1956).
50The former follows because an independent sum of random variables with log-concave and symmetric
densities again produces a random variable with symmetric and log-concave density.
51Model (S.1) could be further modified to capture that confusion occurs only once a sufficient number
of features have been implemented (i.e., information is sufficiently rich). This could be achieved by
introducing a threshold value n̄ ∈ N such that εj(nj) =
∑nj
s=0 Zs if nj > n̄ and εj(nj) = O otherwise.
52Note that (S.1) also allows for a non-cognitive explanation, where the “features” are perceived
without error but of heterogeneous valuations to the agents, but some agents like certain features that
others dislike in a way that the effects cancel out across the agent population.
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The set of marketing strategies A now corresponds to all possible selections, i.e., any
marketing activity aj belongs to the power set of Z, where aj = ∅ means that no feature
is chosen and εj is degenerate. If the density of Z is log-concave and coordinate-wise
symmetric, so is the density of any non-empty selection Mj, meaning that εj(Mj) is
symmetric and log-concave as well. Assuming independence between ε1(M1) and ε2(M2)
implies that ε(M1,M2) = ε2(M2) − ε1(M1) ∈ H, and ε(M1,M2) ∈ Ĥ if and only if
Mj 6= ∅ for some j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, the current set of marketing technology can be
partially ordered according to MPS. In particular, ε(M ′1,M
′
2) is a mean-preserving spread
of ε(M1,M2) whenever Mj (M ′j, j = 1, 2.
Limited comparability and framing Marketing sometimes emphasizes that prod-
uct complexity should be viewed as a synthetic phenomenon of all marketing messages
interacting with each other, leading to a market level or “category complexity” (Mützel
and Kilian, 2016). Likewise, “ambiguity confusion” (Walsh et al., 2007) occurs if different
information about various products leave consumers with many possible interpretations.
In case of product labels, evidence indicates that not only the sheer number of labels
can be a source of confusion, but also their contents relative to each other and across
brands. For example, a two-year study by the British Food Advisory Committee con-
cluded that labels like “fresh”, “original” or “pure”, which are frequently used to describe
food products, result in consumer confusion because they seem similar but still can mean
quite different things.53 Likewise, the “Nutrition facts label” introduced in the 1980’s in
the US, originally intended to allow consumers to make more informed food choices, has
apparently turned out to be a source of consumer confusion.54 In sum, the chosen mar-
keting activities (labels, ads, design aspects,...) jointly affect the individual evaluations
of each product in the sense that εj = εj(a1, a2), j = 1, 2. For instance, if one food brand
uses the label “original” while another brand uses “authentic”, the comparison of the two
labels by consumers may cause confusion, which could have been avoided if both firms
had coordinated on the same label.
A related point is made by Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou
53To quote the principal policy advisor at the British Consumer Association: “Labels are all too often
more of a marketing gimmick than a way of providing meaningful information to help consumers make.”
See the article “Report reveals food label confusion” published on DailyMail.
54In a recent online article (“The Nutrition Facts: Food Label Confusion”, July 2016), GlobalVision,
a company specializing in packaging and labeling, stressed that “unless you work in the industry, it is
very difficult to decipher food labels accurately.” Confusion in the comparison of products due to food
labels has also been experimentally verified by Leek et al. (2015).
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(2013) in a homogeneous goods model, where the mutual choices of “frames”, specifically
ways to present the price of a product, determines whether or not a consumer can com-
pare the prices of both products. If a comparison can be made, the consumer chooses the
cheaper product; otherwise the consumer picks at random. Our framework can accom-
modate a notion of limited comparability by supposing that the chosen communication
profile determines the frame by which a consumer compares the products, and as such the
extent to which an adequate comparison can be made.55 To formalize this idea, suppose
that each communication profile (a1, a2) ∈ A induces a frame, i.e., a random variable
ε(a1, a2) ∈ H. The frame captures the range and distribution of the possible errors an
individual consumer can make in her product comparison. For example, a frame that
facilitates a comparison is such that ε(a1, a2) has much of its probability mass around
zero. Accordingly, with such a frame the consumers are more likely to make only small
comparative mistakes.
Spiegler (2014) also considers a homogeneous-goods model, where two firms simulta-
neously choose their marketing messages, which jointly determine the distribution of the
frames a single consumer could adopt. The adopted frame, in turn, determines the choice
probabilities of each firm. It is possible to implement this idea in our framework as well.
Let F ⊂ R be the set of possible frames, where each f ∈ F corresponds to a determin-
istic way how a consumer draws a product comparison. The actual frame adopted by
the consumer after being exposed to a communication profile a is unknown to the firms,
while they know the probability distribution εa over the possible frames induced by a.
It is easy to see that under the respective assumptions on F and εa, a ∈ A, an error
structure that is consistent with our framework results.56
Product and preference uncertainty Another source of confusion in the evaluation
of products is the case of inadequate product information. A lack of communication by
the firm may imply that consumers are forced to form conjectures about the value of
a product and its attributes. Suppose that each firm can decide how much qualified
information to display to consumer regarding their product. The less information is
provided, the more consumers need to guess the relevant valuation of the product for
55Given the additive structure of (1) we can interpret the chosen frames as affecting net valuations
or the price percepts.
56As a more technical remark, a property called Weighted Regularity (WR) plays a critical role for
the equilibrium analysis in the homogeneous-good model of Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Spiegler
(2014). It is quite easy to see that WR may or may not be satisfied under the assumptions we imposed
on our model, meaning that WR is not critical for our analysis.
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them. To illustrate, let A = [0, 1] and suppose that consumer guessing for the value
of firm j’s product is depicted by a random variable εj(aj) with a uniform distribution
on [−aj, aj]. Then, aj = 0 corresponds to the case that firm j provides all relevant
information, and less information (higher aj) leads to more noisy product perception.
This example highlights a connection to the literature on informative advertising
(Bagwell, 2007). In that literature, information typically is of a binary nature, where a
consumer can either be perfectly informed about a product with all its relevant attributes,
or entirely uninformed about its existence. In our case, consumers always know that both
products exist, but require information to judge the extent to which the product matches
their needs. Our model then asks when firms may deliberately abstain from providing
consumers with sufficient information to annihilate product uncertainty from a market.
Further, if consumers have a general understanding of the market structure, this could
restrict the type of inference they draw during their product evaluations. As an illustra-
tion, suppose that consumers understand that they are located on a Hotelling line with
firms sitting at the opposed edges, so they are aware of the negative correlation between
true valuations. The communication profiles therefore can only affect perception in a
way that preserves this correlation. Thus, the random variables ε1, ε2 are perfectly neg-
atively correlated, such that ε1 = −ε2, where ε1 ∈ H. This is essentially a model where
marketing has the effect of randomly moving each consumer around her true location on
the Hotelling line. The interpretation is that marketing may either aid or obstruct con-
sumers from properly orienting themselves in a market whose structure they principally
are capable of understanding.
Spurious correlations In the last example, the negative correlation of valuation shocks
originated from a basic understanding of consumers about the market structure. However,
it is also conceivable that consumers form spurious correlations between their evaluations
of the product, independent of the true market structure. As an illustration, suppose
that a firm chooses to present its product in a simplistic way, while its competitor em-
phasizes, in detail, how many features its product has. Some consumers may come to
believe that the second product is better as it seems to offer many functionalities, while
other consumers value positively the apparent simplicity of the first product. However,
in such a situation consumers with a better impression about the second product may
also tend to have a worse view of the first product as being too simple (and vice-versa).
For example, digital cameras for amateurs sometimes even feature more pixels, typically
heavily advertised, than professional cameras, to give the impression that the camera is
able to shoot particularly sharp photos. Likewise, if a firm advertises in superlatives,
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such as Duracel claiming to have the “longest-living batteries”, this may lead some con-
sumers to believe that other batteries must be worse. These examples suggest a spurious
correlation of the following type: If product A is so good, then B must be really bad.
Any such spurious correlation can be captured by the joint distribution of the random
vector (ε1, ε2). An interesting question to ask is how much correlation the firms desire,
if they can influence it through the communication profiles. For example, if for any
(a1, a2) ∈ A, the random vector (ε1(a1, a2), ε2(a1, a2)) is jointly normal,








or a 0-symmetric truncation thereof, then ε = ε2− ε1 also is normal with a variance that
depends on the correlation between ε1, ε2. An interesting insight is that a more negative
correlation leads to a greater dispersion of opinions as measured by the variance.57 In
this sense, the firms’ desire for obfuscation leads to an increasingly polarized evaluation
culture, where consumers judge the products in a way that a better impression of product
A also implies a worse impression of product B.
S.2 Two-Sided Single Crossing Ordering
In this section, we discuss the two-sided single crossing (TSC) ordering of the distributions
{Γa}. Formally, let Γ,Γ′ be two zero-symmetric distribution functions with supports
[−ω, ω] and [−ω′, ω′], respectively. We say that Γ′ is more dispersed than Γ in the sense
of TSC, denoted by Γ′ TSC Γ, if either (i) Γ′ has a density function γ′ while Γ is
degenerate at zero, or (ii) Γ also has a density function γ, ω′ ≥ ω and ∀e, e′ ∈ [0, ω′) with
e′ > e,
γ′(e)− γ(e) ≥ 0 =⇒ γ′(e′)− γ(e′) > 0. (S.3)
In words, (S.3) requires that the two densities intersect at most once in (−ω′, 0] and
[0, ω′), respectively; see Figure S.1.
Assumption S1 (TSC ordering) A ⊂ R+ is compact, and εa = O ⇔ a = 0. More-
over, ∀a, a′ ∈ A with a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′, Γa′ TSC Γa.
The following theorem shows that we obtain the same type of result as with the MPS
ordering (Theorem 2).
57This type of reasoning generalizes beyond the normal case if the family of densities resulted by the









(b) Γ′ TSC Γ, supp(γ′) ) supp(γ).
Figure S.1: Examples of TSC orderings
Theorem S1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and S1 hold.
(i) If there exists δ > 0 such that supp(εa) ⊂ [−δ, δ],∀a ∈ A and true match values are
δ-indecisive, then there exists a unique SPE, and confusion is maximal.
(ii) If there exists δ > 0 such that supp(εa) ⊂ [−δ, δ],∀a ∈ A and true match values are
δ-polarized, then there exists a unique SPE, and confusion is minimal.
Proof: Consider part (i). Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, for this part of the proof
it is without loss to assume that 0 /∈ A. Take any a, a′ such that a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′.
Let supp(εa) = [−ωa, ωa] and supp(εa′) = [−ωa′ , ωa′ ]. Assumption S1 implies that there
exists a unique ê ∈ (0, ωa′), such that γa′(e)−γa(e) < 0 ∀e ∈ [0, ê), and γa′(e)−γa(e) > 0
∀e ∈ (ê, ωa′ ]. Since g0 is strictly decreasing on [0, ωa′ ] ⊂ [0, δ], we further have∫ ωa′
ê
g0(e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de <
∫ ωa′
ê








































g0(−e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de+
∫ ωa′
ê





g0(e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de+
∫ ωa′
ê
g0(e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de
]
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from (S.4). We have thus shown that ga′(0) < ga(0)
for any feasible a 6= a′ with a ≤ a′. Hence, if preferences are δ-indecisive, ga(0) must
be uniquely minimized at a∗ = (ā, ā). By arguments analogous to the case with MPS
ordering (Theorem 2), we can conclude that there exists a unique SPE, and a∗ = (ā, ā)
is the unique equilibrium outcome in the first stage. The proof for part (ii) is analogous,
and thus omitted. 
The MPS Theorem 2 and Theorem S1 cannot be ranked according to their generality.
First, if the distributions {Γa}a∈A are ordered by the TSC criterion, they are also ordered
by the MPS criterion, while the converse generally is false. Second, we only need to impose
indecisive or polarized match values with the TSC ordering in Theorem S1, while we need
their strong counterparts with the MPS ordering in Theorem 2.
S.3 The Role of Outside Options
In this section we analyze the SPE in the model with outside options from Section 4.4,

















, where m > 0 is an exogenous constant, and
vk is symmetrically distributed over [−1, 1] with distribution G0 and density g0. The
parameter m > 0 is relevant only for the decision whether to buy any good, where a
larger value of m means that, ceteris paribus, a consumer is more likely to purchase a
good. The example in the main text corresponds to the special case m = 2.
Assumption S2 G0 is log-concave on supp g0 = [−1, 1], g0 is continuous on [−1, 1] with
g0(0) > 0, and ∀a ∈ A such that εa 6= O, εa has a density γa that is log-concave on
supp(γa).
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In the current setting, the distribution of vk coincides with the distribution of the true
match advantages. As a result, Assumption S2 implies Conditions (i)-(iii) of Proposition
1. These conditions assured the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium in the pricing
stage of the game without outside option for any given communication profile a ∈ A, and
play a similar role here. We begin our analysis with a characterization of the symmetric
equilibria in the pricing stage.
Proposition S1 Suppose that Assumption S2 holds. In the above game with outside
option, there exists a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in the pricing stage,
























where pMa solves the monopoly problem maxp≥0 Π
M
a (p) ≡ p (1−Ga(2p−m)) . The equi-




All proofs are at the end of this section. The competition resulting from the presence
of sufficiently many perceptually indifferent consumers (ga(0) > 1/m) disciplines both
firms to choose an equilibrium price for which the outside option is non-binding for every
consumer.58 For lower values of ga(0), competition is less intense, yielding a strong
temptation to increase prices. As long as ga(0) ∈ [ 12m ,
1
m
], both firms settle exactly at




firms increase prices even though some consumers exit the market.
In essence, the pricing pattern identified by Proposition S1 determines what type of
communication strategies the firms choose in the first stage. Specifically, if ga(0) ≥ 1m
∀a ∈ A, the SPE identified by Theorems 1 and 2 apply given the respective assumptions
on g0. Further, if true preferences are strongly indecisive on supp g0 = [−1, 1], ga(0) ≥ 12m
∀a ∈ A and {Γa} verify an MPS order, maximal obfuscation is always an SPE outcome.60
Most importantly, Proposition S1 suggests that the firms may desire to confuse on a
massive scale so that they can then exploit some local monopoly power, even though
many consumers choose to exit.
58See Armstrong and Zhou (2019) for a similar result in a different setup.
59Absent a binding outside option, both firms would increase their price above m/2.
60The only difference to the case without outside option is that uniqueness of equilibrium may fail,
despite an MPS ordering. In particular, any a ∈ A inducing a value ga(0) ∈ [ 12m ,
1
m ] is an SPE with
second-stage price p∗a = m/2.
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To confirm this idea, we now analyze the tractable case where Γa follows a uniform
distribution with support [−ωa, ωa], ∀a ∈ A, and g0(0) > 1m . The latter assumption
implies that without confusion the equilibrium price p∗0 =
1
2g0(0)
is such that the outside
option is non-binding for all consumers. In addition, we assume that m ≥ 2, which sim-
plifies the presentation of results. We first apply Proposition S1 to derive the equilibrium
price, firm demand and payoff as a function of consumer confusion ω given that confusion
is massive (ω ≥ 1).
Corollary S1 Let m ≥ 2 and suppose that Assumption S2 is satisfied. For any given
ω > 0, let Γω follow a uniform distribution with support [−ω, ω], and let pω denote the
symmetric equilibrium price in the pricing game given consumer confusion Γω. Likewise,
let dω and Πω denote the corresponding demand and payoff of each firm. Then pω, dω,Πω :
R++ → R are continuous functions of ω, and if confusion is massive (ω ≥ 1), we have
pω =





















if ω ∈ [1,m]
ω+m
4ω
if ω > m
,
and Πω = pωdω. If 1 ≤ ω ≤ m all consumers buy a product; if ω > m the fraction of
consumers leaving the market is L(ω) = ω−m
2ω
> 0, which is strictly increasing in ω with
limω→∞ L(ω) = 1/2.
Corollary S1 shows that equilibrium prices and payoffs are increasing and unbounded in
the range of confusion ω, despite an increasing fraction of consumers who abstain from
acquiring any product.
We now ask how the intensity of confusion ω = ωa is determined by strategically
behaving firms that fully anticipate the profit schedule Πω resulting from the various
feasible confusion intensities. We impose a structure on the mapping a 7→ ωa that
is consistent with the MPS order Assumption 3: A ⊂ R+ is compact, 0 ∈ A, and
ω : A → R+ is such that ωa′ > ωa iff a′ ≥ a and a′ 6= a.61 Further, define ā ≡ maxA > 0
and ω̄ ≡ ωā as the maximally feasible confusion. Given this structure, we now show that
the SPE follow the same pattern as identified by Theorems 1-3 except that the chosen
communication strategies may lead to consumer exit from the market.
Consider first the case where ω̄ ≤ 1, such that massive confusion is not feasible. If
preferences are indecisive on [−1, 1], then ga(0) = 12ωa
∫ ωa
−ωa g0(e)de is strictly decreasing
61It is easily checked that the uniform distribution verifies the TSC order criterion (see Appendix S1).
A simple example is given by ω(a) = z(a1 +a2) where z is any strictly increasing function with z(0) = 0.
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, it follows that ga(0) >
1
m
∀a ∈ A, and Proposition S1 implies that p∗a = 12ga(0) ,
∀a ∈ A. This shows that with indecisive preferences and ω̄ ≤ 1 (i) any SPE is such that
no consumer leaves the market, (ii) there cannot be an SPE without confusion (as in
Theorem 1), and (iii) maximal confusion is the unique SPE outcome in case of strongly
indecisive preferences (as in Theorem 2). If preferences are polarized on [−1, 1], then ga(0)




follows from Proposition S1 that p∗a =
1
2ga(0)
, ∀a ∈ A. Thus, (i) any SPE is such that
no consumer leaves the market, (ii) education always is an SPE outcome (as in Theorem
1), and education is the unique SPE outcome with strongly polarized preferences (as in
Theorem 2).
The following result allows for the possibility that massive confusion may arise. The
main point is that maximal confusion becomes the unique SPE outcome if confusion can
become massive enough, even though a substantial portion of consumers chooses not to
buy at all.
Proposition S2 Consider the above example where Γa follows a uniform distribution for
each a ∈ A. If G0 is indecisive on supp g0, then a unique SPE with maximal confusion
always exists, and a fraction max{ ω̄−m
2ω̄
, 0} of consumers leaves the market. If G0 is
polarized on supp g0, then maximal confusion is an SPE outcome whenever ω̄ ≥ m2 , and

















Pr (υ ≥ p1 − p2 − e, υ ≥ 2p1 −m− e) dΓa(e)
=
∫
min {Pr (υ ≥ p1 − p2 − e) ,Pr (υ ≥ 2p1 −m− e)} dΓa(e)
=1−
∫
max {G0 (p1 − p2 − e) , G0 (2p1 −m− e)} dΓa(e).
Recall that, for all x ∈ R,
Ga(x) =
∫









if p ≤ m
2
,
1−Ga(2p−m) if p > m2 .
(A.6)
Let Πa1(p1, p2) = p1Da(p1, p2). For every p2 > 0, the function Π
a
1 is differentiable in p1




= 1−Ga(p1 − p2)− p1ga(p1 − p2),
which is also the left derivative of Πa1(p1, p2) at p1 = m − p2. Similarly, if p1 > m − p2,
such that Da(p1, p2) = 1−Ga(2p1 −m), we have
∂Πa1(p1, p2)
∂p1
= 1−Ga(2p1 −m)− 2p1ga(2p1 −m),
which is also the right derivative of Πa1(p1, p2) at p1 = m− p2.
Since log-concavity is preserved under convolution, the function Ga is log-concave on
its support supp(ga). In addition, since Ga is a distribution function, its log-concavity
also holds on [0,+∞). Hence, for all p2 > 0 and a ∈ A, the demand function Da(p1, p2)
must be log-concave in p1 on both [0,m − p2] and [m − p2,+∞). Note that we are
not claiming that Da(p1, p2) is log-concave in p1 on the entire interval [0,+∞). In what
follows, we will show that although the global log-concavity of the demand function is not
assured, Assumption S2 is still sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique symmetric
equilibrium in every subgame of the pricing stage.
First, suppose that ga(0) >
1
m






Then, for any p1 ≤ m2 the whole market is guaranteed to be covered (i.e., every consumer












· ga(0) = 0,















implies that p1 =
1
2ga(0)





























To see this, note that if p1 > m − 12ga(0) , then some consumers choose their outside
options even though they would prefer firm 1 over firm 2. Therefore, a deviation to
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p1 > m − 12ga(0) cannot be more profitable than it would have been in the case without
outside option. But then, as we have shown in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, in the
absence of the outside option, choosing p1 =
1
2ga(0)
actually uniquely maximizes firm 1’s
expected profits over [0,+∞) given that its competitor plays p2 = 12ga(0) . This implies
that deviating to p1 > m− 12ga(0) cannot be profitable either in the presence of the outside
option. Therefore, p1 =
1
2ga(0)














indeed constitutes an equilibrium in the pricing subagme.
It is easy to see that this is the only symmetric equilibrium with a price strictly less than
m
2









−m · ga(0) <
1
2
− 1 < 0
and ΠMa (p) is strictly quasi-concave, even a monopoly firm would not choose a price
p ≥ m
2
. Hence, when ga(0) >
1
m
, there cannot be any symmetric equilibrium in which
both firms choose a price larger than m
2












Next, consider the case ga(0) ∈ [ 12m ,
1
m
]. Taking p2 =
m
2




is a best response for firm 1. As mentioned, the profit function Π1(p1, p2) is
differentiable in p1 on R++\{m − p2} and semi-differentiable at the point p1 = m − p2.








































,+∞), the above in-
equalities imply that p1 =
m
2






on each of these two inter-
vals. This shows that p1 =
m
2







if ga(0) ∈ [ 12m ,
1
m
], the game in the pricing stage admits a symmetric equilibrium with
p1 = p2 =
m
2








market coverage (as p1 < m− p2), and must be a solution to the first order condition





, where the condition p1 <
m
2




















and ΠMa (p) is strictly quasi-concave, even a monopoly firm would not choose a price
strictly higher than m
2











is the unique symmetric pure-strategy








Finally, suppose that ga(0) <
1
2m












−m · ga(0) > 0
and ΠMa (p) is strictly quasi-concave on [0,+∞). Now suppose that firm 2 plays p2 = pMa ,
and consider firm 1’s profit function Π1(p1, p
M
a ). Given the formula of the demand function









a ) > Π
M
a (p1) ≥ Πa1(p1, pMa ) ∀p1 ∈ [0,+∞)\{pMa },
which further implies that p1 = p
M















, there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium with




















−m · ga(0) > 0,
p1 = p2 =
m
2










Taken together, the above derivations prove that the equilibrium price p∗a is deter-




completing the proof. 
Proof of Corollary S1 Let gω denote the density of the perceived match advantages
given that the perception errors ε follow the uniform distribution Γω. It is easily checked
that for any ω > 0, the density γω is log-concave on its support. Thus, Assumption 4.4
is satisfied, and Proposition S1 applies to the case of uniformly distributed perception
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errors. Specifically, the equilibrium price is determined by (S.5), where we replace p∗a by












whenever ω ≥ 1, which we assume in the following.
Given that ω ≥ 1, the condition gω(0) > 1m is equivalent to ω <
m
2
. Thus, for ω ∈ [1, m
2
),





, and hence pω =
1
2gω(0)
= ω by (S.5). Next, given that




gω(0) ∈ [ 12m ,
1
m
], and thus pω =
m
2
for ω ∈ [m
2
,m] by (S.5). Finally, gω(0) <
1
2m
iff ω > m,
in which case (S.5) implies that pω is given by the monopoly price p
M
ω . We now show





, independent of the shape of g0. If pω denotes













g0(s)ds = 0 (S.6)
To calculate the value of pω we need to evaluate the two integrals in the previous expres-
sions. By Proposition S1, we know that pω >
m
2
, which implies that 2pω −m+ ω > 1 for
the upper bounds of the two integrals (recalling that ω ≥ 1). We now conjecture (and ex
post verify) that 2pω−m−ω < −1. Recalling that supp g0 = [−1, 1] and
∫ 1
−1G0(s)ds = 1
as a consequence of symmetry, (S.6) evaluates to pω =
ω+m
4
given the presumption that




, confirming that pMω =
ω+m
4
must be the monopoly price. In sum, these steps
show that pω must be as stated by Corollary S1. Continuity of pω in ω then is obvious
for ω ∈ [1,∞). As the equilibrium price pω is determined by (S.5), it follows from (S.5)
and the previous result that pω is continuous on the entire range ω ∈ (0,∞) whenever




−ω g0(e)de for any ω > 0, the last
property is obviously verified.
Turning to equilibrium demand, the proof of Proposition S1 shows that as long as
1 ≤ ω ≤ m (i.e., gω(0) ≥ 12m) the equilibrium price is such that the outside option is not
binding for (almost) all consumers, meaning that dω = 1/2 for ω ∈ [1,m]. If ω > m, the
equilibrium price is given by pMω =
ω+m
4




. The expression for equilibrium profits Πω = pωdω then follows immediately.
Continuity of dω and of Πω = pωdω in ω follow from the continuity of pω. Finally, the
claims about L(ω) follows from L(ω) = 1− 2dω. 
Proof of Proposition S2 Suppose that preferences are indecisive on [−1, 1]. If ω̄ ≤ m,
the existence of a unique SPE with maximal confusion immediately follows from Theorem
S1. If ω̄ > m, the same result holds because it is shown in Corollary S1 that Πω is
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strictly increasing in ω for ω ≥ m. It is then clear that no consumer leaves the market in




) of consumers leaves the
market when ω̄ > m.
Next, consider the case of polarized preferences. Corollary S1 assures that Πω is
(weakly) increasing in ω whenever ω > m
2
in this case. The firms benefit from confusion
relative to an educated market if Π0 =
1
4g0(0)




, Corollary S1 shows that a sufficient condition for Π0 < Πω̄ is that ω̄ ≥ m2 .
Thus, if ω̄ ≥ m
2
, then maximal confusion is an SPE outcome (while education is not). As
Πω is strictly increasing in ω for ω ≥ m, it follows that maximal confusion is the unique
SPE outcome whenever ω̄ > m. 
S.4 Welfare Loss: Additional Results
The following two propositions formalize the claims made in Section 4.3 about the size
of the welfare loss in the case of indecisive preferences.
Proposition S3 Consider the price competition application, and suppose that for any
a ∈ A, εa is uniformly distributed on [−ωa, ωa], ωa > 0, whenever εa is non-degenerate.
Then, the expected welfare loss (4) is strictly increasing in ωa.
Proof: Let κ ≡ sup supp (g0). We can write the expected welfare loss from mismatch



















































if ω < κ. Since by assumption G0 is a non-degenerate distribution, L
′(ω) > 0 ∀ω > 0.
Hence, the expected welfare loss is strictly increasing in ω. 
Proposition S4 Consider the model with competition on the line. Suppose that εa is
as in Proposition S3. If ωa < ω̂ ≡ 64/15, then the expected welfare loss (4) is strictly
decreasing in α. If ωa > ω̂, then the expected welfare loss is strictly increasing in α.
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∀x ∈ R, the density function of G0, which we denote as
























if x ∈ [−4λ2, 4λ2],
0 otherwise.














































































































































Hence, provided that ω ∈ (0, 4λ2], we further have




















10/3 ≈ 4.22 > 4, it follows that L′(α) < 0 whenever ω ≤ 4λ2.























































































Figure S.2: The Salop circle
Hence, provided that ω > 4λ2, we further have














⇐⇒ ω > 64
15
λ2.
Note that 64/15 ≈ 4.27 > 4. We can now conclude that L′(α) < 0 whenever ω < ω̂ ≡
64λ2/15, and L′(α) > 0 whenever ω > ω̂. 
S.5 Confusion About Needs on a Salop Circle
In the following application, we use a Salop circle to further pursue the idea sketched at
the end of Section 3.4 that the communication profiles influence how precisely the agents
can learn their true needs. As the Salop model (Salop, 1979) has become a textbook-style
workhorse model in IO and related fields, the subsequent analysis of strategic confusion
or education upon a Salop circle is also interesting in itself.
Two firms are located at antipodal locations on a Salop circle, as illustrated in Figure
S.2. Consumers are continuously and symmetrically distributed between the firms, where
we indicate consumer locations in the clockwise direction with θ ∈ [0, 1). By symmetry, it
suffices to specify the model only for the half-circle on the right-hand side. On this half-
circle, consumers are dispersed over the [0, 1/2]-line according to the bounded function
h : R→ R+ with the following properties
(1) h(θ) > 0⇔ θ ∈ [0, 1/2] ,







(4) h is differentiable on (0, 1/4) ∪ (1/4, 1/2),
(S.7)


























Figure S.3: (a) Preferences and (b) profits in the Salop model, t = 1.
∀θ ∈ R. For a consumer located at θ ∈ [0, 1/2], the true match values are
vθ1 = µ− tθ and vθ2 = µ− t(1/2− θ),
where µ, t > 0 are parameters. The match advantage of firm 2 then is vθ∆ = v
θ
2 − vθ1 =
2t(θ − 1/4). The consumer would truly prefer firm 1 if and only if p2 − p1 ≥ vθ∆. We
assume that µ is sufficiently large, such that every consumer will find it worthwhile to
purchase one product in equilibrium.
In accordance with the logic behind Definition 2, we say that the consumer preference
distribution features indecisiveness (polarization) on [0, 1/2] if h(·) is strictly increasing
(decreasing) on (0, 1/4) and thus strictly decreasing (increasing) on (1/4, 1/2). As a
simple example, suppose that h(·) is piecewise linear,
h(θ) =

1 + b(θ − 1/8) if θ ∈ [0, 1/4] ,
1− b(θ − 3/8) if θ ∈ (1/4, 1/2] ,
0 otherwise,
(S.8)
where |b| < 8 to assure that h(θ) > 0 on [0, 1/2]. Then, b > 0 corresponds to indecisive
and b < 0 to polarized preferences, while b = 0 gives the standard textbook Salop model
with uniformly distributed consumers. Figure S.3 (a) depicts the preference distribution
for b = 4,−2 and 0.
Locational confusion As in Section 4, firms first choose their communication strate-
gies a ∈ A, and then compete in prices. In the current setting, consumer confusion enters
the model in form of i.i.d. shocks εa to true consumer locations θ. Specifically, confusion
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means that each consumer’s perceived location is distorted around the true location θ
by a 0-symmetric, uniformly distributed shock e ∈ [−ωa, ωa], where ωa ≥ 0 measures
the size of confusion. The interpretation of this model is that communication strategies
influence how well a consumer learns his true needs. If ωa = 0 then θ̂ = θ for each con-
sumer θ ∈ [0, 1], meaning that communication allows each consumer to correctly learn
her location. By contrast, if ωa = 1/2, then θ̂ ∈ [0, 1) ∀θ, meaning that each consumer
could find herself anywhere on the circle, independent of her true location. Note that
obfuscation becomes massive in the sense of Section 3.4 whenever ωa > 1/4, as then a
consumer sitting exactly on a firm’s location may, in principle, be so confused that she
chooses the competitor’s product. Nevertheless, ωa = 1/2 corresponds to the natural
upper bound of such massive obfuscation in the present model.
While the distribution of the perceived match advantages remains unbiased, here a
notable difference to our main setting is that the true match advantages and the per-
ception errors implied by locational confusion are not independent. Unbiasedness follows
directly from the 0-symmetry of the locational shocks. The violation of independence
occurs, in essence, because locational confusion confines the perceptions θ̂ to the circle,
meaning that the range of perceived match advantages must always coincide with the
range of true match advantages.62
Equilibrium analysis For a given ωa ∈ [0, 1/2] and given prices p1, p2, a firm’s demand
consists of those consumers who perceive the firm as offering the better deal. We now
derive a formal expression for the expected demand of firm j = 1. As ωa ∈ [0, 1/2],
e ∈ [−ωa, ωa] and θ ∈ [0, 1/2], it follows that θ + e ∈ [−1/2, 1]. Thus, for each consumer
θ ∈ [0, 1/2], the perceived distance to firm 1 is
d̂1 =
|θ + e| if θ + e ≤ 1/2,1− (θ + e) if θ + e > 1/2.
Fix prices p1, p2 ≥ 0 and define ∆ ≡ p2−p12t . If |∆| ≤ 1/4, the market segment S1 of firm
1 is S1 = {θ ∈ [0, 1] : d̂1 ≤ ∆ + 1/4}. Further, S1 = ∅ if ∆ < −1/4, and S1 = [0, 1]
if ∆ > 1/4. A consumer transacts with firm 1 if her perceived location belongs to S1.
Hence, for ∆ < 1/4 the expected market demand of firm 1 from consumers on the right
half-circle, D1 ∈ [0, 1/2], corresponds to the expected fraction of consumers for whom the
62To illustrate the violation of independence, let t = 1, ωa = 1/4. Then, the perception errors, in
terms of match advantages, implied by locational confusion for the consumer at θ = 0 (hence v0∆ = 0)
have supp ε0a = [0, 1/2]. By contrast, a consumer with location θ = 1/4 (hence v
1/4
∆ = 0) experiencing
the same type of locational shock has supp ε
1/4
a = [−1/2, 1/2]. Thus, εa and v∆ cannot be independent.
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true location is on [0, 1/2] and the perceived locations is in S1:
D1(∆, ωa) = Pr (−1/4−∆ ≤ θ + εa ≤ 1/4 + ∆) + Pr (θ + εa ≥ 3/4−∆) , (S.9)
where the probabilities in (S.9) should be interpreted as conditional on θ ∈ [0, 1/2].
The second term in (S.9) captures that some consumers with location in the segment
(1/4 + ∆, 1/2], who actually would be better-off by choosing firm 2, may obtain per-
ceived locations in the segment (3/4, 1) for sufficiently large obfuscation ωa, and then
(erroneously) choose firm 1.
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis, relying on the standard first-order ap-
proach as is common in applications of the Salop model (see, e.g., Grossman and Shapiro
(1984)).63 For |∆(p1, p2)| < 1/4 and ωa ∈ [0, 1/2], the expected profit of firm j = 1 in
the pricing stage is







where D1(∆(p1, p2), ωa) is given by (S.9). A symmetric pricing equilibrium pa in the
pricing stage corresponds to a solution of ∂
∂p1
Π1(pa, pa) = 0. As shown in the proof of the
next proposition, such a unique solution pa exists for every ωa, and we assume that pa
then also corresponds to the equilibrium price in the pricing stage. In the following, we
show how firms’ profit Πa = pa
2
in the symmetric pricing equilibrium of the pricing stage
depends on the confusion parameter ω ∈ [0, 1/2] (we suppress the a-index for simplicity).
Proposition S5 In the Salop model with locational confusion, the following cases can be
distinguished:
(i) (Indecisiveness) If the preference distribution is indecisive, there exists a unique
ω0 ∈ (1/4, 1/2) such that prices and profits increase strictly in ω up to ω0, and
decrease strictly thereafter. Moreover, prices and profits are minimized at ω = 0.
(ii) (Polarization) If the preference distribution is polarized, there exists a unique ω0 ∈
(1/4, 1/2) such that prices and profits decrease strictly in ω up to ω0, and increase
strictly thereafter. Moreover, prices and profits are maximized at ω = 0.
(iii) (Uniform Dispersion) If the preference distribution is uniform, i.e., h(θ) = 1 on
[0, 1/2] then the prices and profits are pω = t/2 and Π(ω) = t/4, ∀ω ∈ [0, 1/2].
63This approach essentially takes the existence of a symmetric price equilibrium as given, in that
sufficiency of the first-order condition for profit maximization at a symmetric solution of ∂Π1∂p1 = 0 in the
pricing stage is presumed.
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The proof is at the end of this section. Proposition S5 shows that as long as confusion
cannot become massive (ωa ≤ 1/4 ∀a ∈ A), the dispersion of preferences on the Salop
circle has the same implication for the effects of confusion as in the baseline model. In
particular, firms are only harmed (can only benefit) from such confusion if preferences are
polarized (indecisive). Intuitively, this is the case because competition on each half-circle
of the Salop model is akin to competition on the line for small enough confusion.
If confusion becomes massive, however, the Salop model offers new insights. Specifi-
cally, firms cannot benefit from maximally confused consumers independent of whether
preferences are indecisive or polarized: In the latter case they prefer education (ω = 0)
and in the former case the intermediate level of confusion given by ω0. In the knife-edge
case where consumers are uniformly distributed, confusion has no effects on prices and
profits at all. These different cases are illustrated in Figure S.3 (b). The intuition is
that massive confusion has two effects. First, some right-hand side consumers actually
favoring firm j = 1 may become indifferent on the right-hand circle (θ̂ = 1/4). Second,
some consumers who are located on the left-hand circle and who favor firm j = 1 may be
so confused as to become indifferent on the right-hand circle. The second effect is absent
in a Hotelling model. With indecisive preferences, the share of consumers that become
perceptually indifferent in the sense of the second effect increases in confusion, which
explains why firms are eventually harmed by confusion once it becomes large enough.
While this effects is partly reversed with polarized preferences, it is not possible to soften
competition more with confusion as given by the case of educated consumers. Finally,
confusion has no impact on competition with uniform preferences, because the average
inflow and outflow of perceptually indifferent consumers exactly compensate each other
in this case.
Proof of Proposition S5 Let |∆| < 1/4. For ω = 0, (S.9) then yields
D1(∆, 0) = Pr (θ ≤ 1/4 + ∆) + Pr (θ ≥ 3/4−∆) = H (1/4 + ∆) .






























H(1/4 + ∆ + ω)−H(1/4 + ∆− ω)
2ω
+
H(−1/4−∆ + ω)−H(−1/4−∆− ω)
2ω
+
H(3/4−∆ + ω)−H(3/4−∆− ω)
2ω
. (S.12)















Let ω ∈ (0, 1/4). Noting that h(θ) = 0 whenever θ /∈ [0, 1/2], we obtain from (S.12)
Z(ω) =
2ωh(1/4 + ω)− (H(1/4 + ω)−H(1/4− ω))
2ω2
.
The symmetry of h at θ = 1/4 implies
H (1/4 + ω)−H (1/4− ω) = 2H (1/4 + ω)− 1/2. (S.15)
Using this and H(1/4) = 1/4 in (S.15), we have











h(1/4 + ω)dθ = h(1/4 +ω)ω, thus Z(ω) < 0 by (S.16). Hence







h(1/4 + ω)dθ = h(1/4+ω)ω, thus Z(ω) > 0 by (S.16). Hence










ω = ω, thus Z(ω) = 0 by (S.16).
Hence obfuscation has no effects on prices and profits by (S.14) for ω ∈ (0, 1/4).
Next, suppose that ω ∈ (1/4, 1/2].64 Then, (S.12) gives
Z(ω) =
ω (h(ω − 1/4) + h(3/4− ω))− (1 +H(ω − 1/4)−H(3/4− ω))
2ω2
. (S.17)
64The case ω = 1/4 is not problematic, because ∂D1(0, ω)/∂∆ is continuous at ω = 1/4.
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Using h(ω − 1/4) = h(3/4 − ω) and H(ω − 1/4) = 1/2 −H(3/4 − ω), the nominator of
Z(ω) becomes
z(ω) ≡ 2ωh(3/4− ω)− 3/2 + 2H(3/4− ω). (S.18)








< 0, and lim
ω↑1/2
z(ω) = h(1/4)− 1
2
> 0.
Further, for ω ∈ (1/4, 1/2) we have z′(ω) = −2ωh′(3/4 − ω) > 0. These arguments,
together with the continuity of z(ω), assure the existence of a unique ω0 ∈ (1/4, 1/2),
such that for ω ∈ [1/4, 1/2]
z(ω), Z(ω)

< 0 if ω < ω0,
= 0 if ω = ω0,
> 0 if ω > ω0.
It then follows from (S.14) that Π(ω) and pω must have a global maximum at ω0 ∈
[1/4, 1/2]. Note from (S.12) that ∂D1(0,1/2)
∂∆
= 1, which by (S.13) implies that p1/2 = t/2,
and Π(1/2) = t/4. If ω = 0, then ∂D1(0,0)
∂∆
= h(1/4), and thus p0 = t/(2h(1/4)), and
Π(0) = t/(4h(1/4)). Because h(1/4) > 1 with indecisive preferences, prices and profits
must be minimal at ω = 0, which completes the proof for (i). Case (ii) can be proved
similarly. For (iii), note that if h(θ) = 1 on (1/4, 1/2], then z(ω) = 0 on (1/4, 1/2]. 
S.6 Ex-Ante Asymmetric Contestants
In this section, we consider the formal model on which the intuitive discussion about ex-
ante asymmetric contestants in Section 5.2 is based on. We suppose that every choice of
communication profile a determines a parameter ω = ω(a) ∈ [0, ω̄] of the density function
γ(·, ω) of the perception errors ε, where ω̄ is exogenously given.
The following technical assumptions are imposed on γ(·, ω). First, supp γ(·, ω) ⊂
supp γ(·, ω′) whenever ω < ω′. Second, γ(·, ω) is a zero-symmetric and log-concave C1-
density function on its support for any given ω ∈ (0, ω̄). Third, γ(·, ω′) is an MPS
of γ(·, ω) whenever ω′ > ω. We also take γ(x, ω) to be continuously differentiable in
ω at any x ∈ supp γ(·, ω). We denote the distribution and density of the perceived
match advantages for any given as G(·, ω) and g(·, ω), respectively. Further, we let
G(x, 0) ≡ G0(x) and g(x, 0) ≡ g0(x).
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The payoff functions are given by (2) with R(s1, s2) = 1, where we replace Ga(s1−s2)
by G(s1 − s2, ω) given our notational convention, where G(s1 − s2, ω) =
∫ s1−s2
−∞ g(s, ω)ds
is the market share of contestant 1 for effort profile (s1, s2). Further, we assume that
C1, C2 are C
2-functions with C ′j(s), C
′′
j (s) > 0 for any s > 0 and Cj(0) = 0, j = 1, 2. We
assume that payoffs are strictly quasi-concave in own strategies for any given ω ∈ [0, ω̄),
meaning that g′(s1 − s2, ω) − C ′′j (sj) < 0 whenever g(s1 − s2, ω) = C ′j(sj). For a given
ω ∈ [0, ω̄), an interior effort equilibrium s1(ω), s2(ω) is then determined by the first-order
system
g(s1 − s2, ω) = C1′(s1), g(s1 − s2, ω) = C2′(s2). (S.19)
In the following we consider ex-ante asymmetry of the contestants in terms of ranked
cost functions, where C ′1(s) < C
′
2(s) for any s > 0. We refer to j = 1 as the strong, and
to j = 2 as the weak contestant, respectively. Our main result in this section shows that
the incentive to obfuscate or educate is quite unambiguous for the weak contestant.
Proposition S6 If, for some sufficiently large δ > 0, g0 is strongly indecisive on [−δ, δ],
the weak contestant unambiguously desires maximal agent confusion (ω = ω̄). If g0 is
strongly polarized on [−δ, δ], the weak contestant unambiguously desires minimal agent
education (ω = 0).
Proof of Proposition S6 We prove the proposition in a serious of lemmas. Note that
in for follow, we take for granted the existence of a unique effort equilibrium s1(ω), s2(ω) >
0 for any given ω ∈ [0, ω̄).65
Lemma S1 For any given ω ∈ [0, ω̄], s1(ω) > s2(ω) and Π1(ω) > Π2(ω).
Proof: By (S.19), C ′1(s1) = C
′
2(s2) in equilibrium, from which s1 > s2 follows. Equilib-
rium payoffs are Π1(ω) = G(s1− s2, ω)−C1(s1) and Π2(ω) = 1−G(s1− s2, ω)−C2(s2).







− C2(s2) > Π2(ω),




2(s) for all s > 0. 
65Our formal analysis below can be extended to show that, actually, the strong quasi-concavity as-
sumption already assures that at most one equilibrium can exist in the effort game.
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Define s∆(ω) ≡ s1(ω) − s2(ω). Note that for sufficiently large δ > 0 (which we
assumed), s∆(ω) ∈ [0, δ − ω̄) ∀ω ∈ [0, ω̄].
Lemma S2 Suppose that g0 is strongly indecisive (polarized) on supp g0. For any given
x ∈ [0, δ − ω̄), g(x, ω) is strictly decreasing (increasing) in ω.
Proof: The requirement x ∈ [0, δ − ω̄) assures that supp gω(x) ⊂ (−δ, δ) for any
ω ∈ (0, ω̄]. The claims follow from the proof of Theorem 2 by replacing ga′(0) with
g(x, ω′) and ga(0) with g(x, ω) in (A.3). 
Lemma S3 Suppose that g0 is strongly indecisive (polarized) on supp g0. For any given
x ∈ (0, δ − ω̄), ω, ω′ ∈ [0, ω̄] with ω < ω′, G(x, ω′) < (>)G(x, ω).













g(s, ω′)ds = G(x, ω′). 




2(ω) < 0. If g0 is strongly





Proof: The assumptions imposed in the current model assure that (S.19) is a system of


















and the claim for the indecisive case follows because g(s∆, ω) is strictly decreasing in ω
by Lemma S2.66 The claim for the polarized case holds because then g(s∆, ω) is strictly
increasing in ω. 
66Strictly spoken, the strict monotonicity in Lemma S2 allows us only to conclude that ∂g(s∆,ω)∂ω ≤ 0.
As ∂g(s∆,ω)∂ω = 0 can never occur on any arbitrary small interval around ω, we ignore the knife-edge case
where ∂g(s∆,ω0)∂ω0 = 0 for some ω0.
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Finally, we apply the Envelope Theorem to see how equilibrium payoffs respond to
marginal changes of ω:
Π1
′(ω) = −g(s1 − s2, ω)s1′(ω) +




′(ω) = −g(s1 − s2, ω)s2′(ω)−
∂G(s1 − s2, ω)
∂ω
. (S.20)
Because g(·) > 0, Lemmas S3 and S4 imply that Π2(ω) is strictly increasing (decreasing)
on [0, ω̄] if g0 is strongly indecisive (strongly polarized). 
The comparative statics (S.20) shows that agent confusion increases equilibrium pay-
offs by a competition-softening effect. In the symmetric model, where s1 = s2 and,
accordingly, G(s1 − s2, ω) = 1/2, this is the only force, explaining why both firms un-
ambiguously benefit from agent confusion. By contrast, the market share effect always
works in opposite directions for the two contestants whenever G(s1 − s2, ω) ∈ (1/2, 1),
showing a potential conflict of interest in the contestants’ desire for confusion or educa-
tion. Nevertheless, it turns out that the sensitivity and market share effects always work
in the same direction for the weak, and always in opposite directions for the strong con-
testant. In particular, the weak (strong) contestant always gains (loses) market share if ω
increases in case of indecisive preferences, and vice-versa in case of polarized preferences.
S.7 Ex-Interim Asymmetry
In this section, we consider a simple extension allowing for the possibility that biased
perception errors εa, leading to ex-interim asymmetries of the contestants, may result
as a consequence of the chosen communication strategies. Suppose that A = {0, 1}, so
that A consists of four ordered pairs, associated with four random variables εa, each with
supp (ga) ⊂ supp (g0). Then, aj = 0 means that j communicates in a neutral way, while
aj = 1 means that j’s communication is obfuscating with the possible effect of biasing
perception towards the firm. We assume that ε0,0 = O, ε1,1 6= O is zero-symmetric, and
ε1,0 = −ε0,1. The symmetry of ε1,1 captures that a communication profile where both
contestants seek to bias valuations in their favor (e.g. both exaggerate the valuations of
their offers) results in unbiased agent confusion.67
67For example, ε1,1 always is zero-symmetric if ε1,1 = ε
2 − ε1 and ε1, ε2 are iid. In particular, let
εa ≡ ε2a2 − ε
1




a2 are independent. Set ε
j
0 = O, and let ε
2





𝑎𝑎 = 0 𝑎𝑎 = 1
Contestant 1
𝑎𝑎 = 0 Π00 , Π00 Π01 , Π10
𝑎𝑎 = 1 Π10 , Π01 Π11 , Π11
Figure S.4: Equilibrium payoffs in effort stage game
Suppose that for any such given εa the effort subgame following εa has a unique effort
equilibrium, with corresponding equilibrium payoffs indicated by Πa, as depicted in the
game matrix of Figure S.4.
In any SPE, the choice of communication profile must induce a Nash equilibrium in
that game. If ε1,0 = ε0,1 is zero-symmetric and ε1,0 6= O, this is just a special case of our
main model and, by Theorem 1, preferences alone are decisive for the type of SPE that
results. It is easily observed that the same equilibrium pattern holds if the bias induced
by aj = 1 is “weak” in the sense that ε1,0 remains close to zero-symmetrically distributed.
Then, the unilateral advantage of a biased communication profile is dominated by the
perception noise it induces. As long as Π00 < (>)Π10 continues to hold, education can
never be (always is) an SPE in case of indecisive (polarized) preferences.
If perception errors are strongly biased in favor of j = 1 if a = (1, 0) is chosen (and
j = 2 is equally favored for a′ = (0, 1)), it becomes conceivable that Π10 > Π00 >
Π01. This reflects a redistribution of the perceived match advantages in favor of j = 1.
Consider first the case of indecisive preferences. Because a potential bias in favor of the
competitor can be annihilated by choosing a = 1, and pure perception noise is beneficial
with indecisive preferences, it follows that Π11 > Π01. Thus, the only equilibrium involves
mutual obfuscation (a1 = a2 = 1), similar to the case with unbiased perception errors.
Now consider the case of polarized preferences, meaning that Π00 > Π11. The type
of SPE now depends crucially on the obfuscation technology. In particular, full agent
education remains the unique equilibrium prediction if consumer education can be uni-
laterally enforced. Then, εa = O whenever a 6= (1, 1), meaning that both contestants
earn Π00, whenever at least one contestant chooses a = 0. Then, any a 6= (1, 1) consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium in the first stage, and agents are fully educated. If however,
uniform on [−ω, 0], ω > 0. Note that then ε1,1 has a zero-symmetric density (a “tent” distribution) on
[−ω, ω].
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education cannot be unilaterally enforced, Π10 > Π00 implies that agent education can-
not be sustained as an SPE outcome. The type of equilibrium then depends on whether
Π01 > Π11 or Π01 < Π11. If Π01 < Π11, correcting the bias is more valuable than the loss in
payoffs incurred from mutual obfuscation due to polarized tastes. Then, the contestants
are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, with mutual obfuscation as the sole equilibrium
outcome, which is both inefficient and harmful for the contestants. If instead Π01 > Π11,
then the contestants end up in a Coordination game with two (pure-strategy) equilibria,
where one contestant earns the rents from a biased communication profile. In sum, agent
preferences play a decisive role for the equilibrium outcome also with potentially biased
communication strategies. In particular, neither a Prisoner’s Dilemma nor a Coordination
game can arise with indecisive tastes.
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